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Nationalism provides a rational framework for the formation of a national identity 
for societies by associating that identity with territory, religion, and/or language. This 
study takes the association of nationalism with religion into account in the Turkish and 
Armenian cases with the aim of providing a new perspective to the Armenian question. 
Instead of ignoring the economic and political reasons, this study seeks the role of 
religion in the conflict which witnessed violence and resulted in a service of tragedies. 
Nationalism aiming at building an independence nation-state was a threat for the 
Ottoman Empire, which consisted of various ethnicities and religions. The Ottoman 
political and social formation was based on religious identities, which enabled its subjects 
to keep their ethnic identities, and these gained priority with the influence of nationalism. 
In order to prevent the dissolution of its millets into essentially national entities, the 
Ottoman administration tried various policies, namely, Ottomanism, Islamism, and 
Turkish nationalism, whose common element was to be Islam, which provided the social 
base and justified the arguments of the ideologies. It was Islam that motivated people to 
fight against infidels in order to defend the homeland (vatan). 
The “self-isolation” process that began with the separation of the Armenian 
Church from the Greek Church in the fourth century transformed into an Armenian 
identity characterized  by religious and ethnic attachments under the hegemony of foreign 
powers. In the context of the Armenian question, the Armenian Gregorian Church 




Armenian identity into nationalist discourses. 
Religious motivation of people toward nationalistic goals by the religious leaders, 
such as Mkrdich Khrimian, a member of the Armenian clergy, can easily embrace 
violence by mobilizing people to sacrifice themselves. Violence has been unavoidable 
when the politicization of religions, namely Islam and Armenian Gregorian Orthodoxy, 
toward nationalistic goals takes a place in the same territory. In the context of the 
Armenian question, the role of religion needs to be examined within the framework of 
politicization with nationalist discourses, which will provide an understanding of the 
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During the early decades of the twentieth century, Turkey witnessed the unfolding 
of several tragic events. Generally speaking, this era was on in which many state and 
nation-building processes began. One example was the events of 1915, which resulted in 
the deaths of millions of people of Turkish and Armenian descent throughout the 
territories of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, the Ottoman decision to relocate the 
Armenians of Eastern Anatolia became an example of a process of nation-building. The 
facts of the case, however, have been largely ignored and manipulated by the official 
discourses of both of the national mythologies. In addition, scholarly examinations of the 
events have been suspected as being the ‘official version’ of one side or the other.1 Most 
of the approaches of both sides to the Armenian question focus on the exact moment of 
the tragic events and ignore the larger social, political, economic, and/or religious origins 
and historical background of the events. 
Culturally and territorially rooted in the regions of present-day Armenia and 
eastern Turkey, the Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian peoples had shared the same lands, 
and had communicated with each other on social, economic, and cultural levels before 
and during Ottoman rule. In the arrangements collectively known as the millet system, 
                                                 
1As examples of this kind of suspicion, see Kakizaki, Masaki “Review Essay: Ethnic Cleansing or 
Genocide?” Middle East Critique, (16: 1, 2007), 85-92; and also for the conclusion of the court case that 
Guenter Lewy filed against David Holthouse and the Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc. alleging that they 
wrote and published defamatory statements that caused him various injuries including reputational harm 
and emotional trauma, see <<https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2008cv1971-34>> 
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the Armenian millet enjoyed and kept its religious, cultural, economic and social relations 
within the Empire, and it was represented by the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul. 
The French Revolution of 1789, which is regarded as a turning point in history, as 
it unleashed the forces of nationalism, also had a significant impact on the Ottoman 
Empire and its subjects. Nationalism gradually became the principal discourse first 
among the Christians of the Balkans and then, although very much later, of the Muslim 
Arabs. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire into ethno-linguistic nation-states began in 
the Balkans in the late nineteenth century, and continued through other regions of the 
Empire in the first decades of the twentieth century. This may be explained by the 
region’s geographical proximity to the West, the fatherland of nationalism, but Balkan 
nationalism was also sedulously encouraged by the Ottomans’ neighbors, especially 
Tsarist Russia. In the much same way Armenian nationalism found relatively early 
acceptance in comparison to that of neighboring ethnicities since the Diaspora Armenians 
channeled Western thought into the Armenian homeland, in which national identity came 
to be a major characteristic of the way in which the Armenian Apostolic Church managed 
the socio-politic relations of its people.  
In this study, I will demonstrate religion as an important component of Turkish 
and Armenian nationalism, as well as the role of religion within the conflict between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Armenians, rather than examining the numerical results of the 
tragedy. The purpose here is not to introduce a new theory on nationalism or identities, 
but to compare the process of formation of both Turkish and Armenian nationalism. 
While social, economic, and political reasons behind the events of 1915 are important to 
keep in mind, as many scholars continue to investigate and argue, the effects of the 
 
3 
politicization of religion must also be considered within the framework of the origins of 
violence, because the majority of the literature on the Armenian question lacks the 
necessary religious perspective that can be used to explain the role of religion as a crucial 
factor in the conflict. Thus, this study is an attempt to emphasize the religious 
characteristics of the Armenian question. 
The first significant conflict between Armenians and the Ottoman Empire 
occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, in which nationalist influence 
began to emerge elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Within the history of the Armenian 
people, ethnic identity was a dominant theme, like Jewish identity in which religion and 
ethnic identity found strength in the historic narratives of foreign domination and 
expulsion. As for the Muslim-Ottomans, Islam was the basis of their identity. While these 
separate identities did not result in clashes, with the emergence of nationalism as a 
political discourse, insistence on national identities led to increased societal tension. By 
taking this reality into account, I am attempting to demonstrate that the interaction 
between religious and nationalistic discourses as well as the mobilization of people based 
upon new concepts of identity and national boundaries, resulted in violence in a specific 
territory.  
This study consists of three main chapters. Chapter I, The Role of Islam in the 
Formation of Turkish Nationalism, examines the formation process of Turkish 
nationalism since the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) in which the first official identification 
of the Empire, partially a reconfiguration of imperial identity was applied. In the long 
aftermath of the French Revolution, the rearrangement of communities in terms of 
national identity gradually began to threaten the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
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Empire. Since the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman government had carried out reforms on 
the basis of patriotic and religious ideology in order to try to maintain its territorial 
integrity. This chapter will examine the formation of Turkish nationalism by taking its 
particular characteristics, especially Islamic, into account. Thus, I will analyze the work 
of Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) and Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), the ideologues of Turkish 
nationalism. The purpose of the chapter is to investigate the three currents of thought 
(Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkish nationalism) in the late Ottoman period in terms of 
political and social constructs rather than as objective historical processes. By doing so, I 
argue, contrary to popular belief, that Turkish nationalism emerged as a continuation of 
Ottomanism and Islamism, rather than emerging as a separate ideology. 
Chapter II, The Role of the Armenian Church in the Formation of Armenian 
Nationalism, examines Armenian nationalism and the role of religion in the formation of 
nationalism. It should be emphasized that Armenian history and historiography always 
stress a national/nationalist discourse. Many modern scholarly works dealing with 
Armenian history speak interestingly of the national awakening of the Armenians long 
before the politicization of national identities. These works can be identified as 
expressions of nationalism itself. There is a dominant theme of “self-isolation” in 
Armenian identity, which first emerged with the separation of the Armenians from the 
Greek Church in the fourth century (religious) and later the notion that the ‘Armenian 
nation’ was hemmed in and ruled by “others” (national). Looking at the subject of 
nationalism, I will examine its interaction with the Armenian Church through a case 
study, of the life and career of Mkrdich Khrimian (1820-1907), a prominent religious and 




dual mission (i.e., religious and national) of the Armenian Church. 
Chapter III, The Politicization of Religion, will evaluate the interaction of religion 
and nationalism, and its results by comparing the Turkish and Armenian cases. This 
chapter will argue that while there were already existing ethnic, religious, and cultural 
attachments and identities, certain conjunctures made these differences come together 
and cause a bloody tragedy in the twentieth century. In order to understand how people 
gravitated towards violence, I will examine the relationship between religion, 




THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE FORMATION OF 
TURKISH NATIONALISM 
Turkish nationalism should be evaluated differently from the ideologies of the 
various nation-states that came into being in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Because of the unique structural and territorial characteristics of the Ottoman 
Empire, the roots of Turkish nationalism can be traced to imperial edicts, such as 
citizenship, which appealed to both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, and their 
loyalty to the Empire. Thus, the key elements of Turkish nationalism changed according 
to the changing circumstances of the Empire during and after the Tanzimat period. 
Homeland, religion, and nation, either together or separately, were emphasized by 
different ideologies which were “designated as the Islamic, the Ottoman, and the Turkish 
principles of identity” in order to save the Empire.2 
In my view, Turkish nationalism is an ideology that evolved from, and was based 
on, Ottomanism and Islamism rather than an ideology that emerged from a separate 
category of ethnic Turkishness. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that through the 
politicization of Islam, the Ottoman administration intended to create a social and 
political base and furthermore, to sustain the unity of the Empire.  
                                                 
2Bernard Lewis, “The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 15, No. 




The Emergence of Turkish Nationalism 
Ottomanism 
In order to maintain social and political order in the face of growing nationalist 
sentiments among non-Muslim communities, mostly in the Balkans, the Ottoman 
administration implemented the Hatt-ı Şerif in 1839, and in 1856, the Islahat reforms. 
The Tanzimat era (1839-1876) brought Westernized institutions and regulations, which 
were generally liberal, secular, and constitutionalist. The emergence of secular courts and 
a secular educational system, together with the creation of a Western-style army and civil 
service were some of the most significant changes that Tanzimat brought to the public 
sphere.3 In addition to maintaining social order, the Tanzimat reforms aimed at creating a 
more centralized authority and a more functional government, which could resolve 
internal conflicts and provide security for all subjects and their property regardless of 
religion, achieving “political, social, and economic integration.”4 Thus, the slogan of the 
Tanzimat was the equality of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion or race, which 
was to be guaranteed by an Ottoman citizenship freely available to all inhabitants of the 
Empire. 
The basic policy of the Empire at this time was the notion of Ottomanism, which 
was based on an Ottoman nation founded on equal rights.5 However, the liberal and 
secular regulations designed to create and strengthen the integrity of the Empire on the 
basis of Ottoman citizenship resulted in the national awakening of both non-Muslim and 
                                                 
3Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
3. 
4Kemal H. Karpat, An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From 




Muslim communities, thus decreasing the integrity of the Empire itself. The extension of 
economic relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the increase in missionary 
activities within the Empire, the effect of the ideas of the French Revolution on the 
Christian population, and the extension of the protection of the Christian subjects of the 
Empire on the part of the Great Powers did not allow the Empire to provide equality for 
all its citizens.6 These factors led the communities to demand extra privileges, including 
independence or their own constitutions,7 and eventually in many cases to rebel against 
the Empire.8 In addition to the national awakening of the various ethnic and religious 
communities, the authoritarian tendencies of the Ottoman government triggered the 
disintegration of the Empire. 
Protesting against the government’s promises of equality implied by the policy of 
Ottomanism, a secret group of elite bureaucrats came into being in 1865, calling itself 
Ittifak-ı Hamiyyet (the Patriotic Alliance).9 Şerif Mardin considers Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha, 
Mehmed Bey, Namık Kemal, Ayetullah Bey, and Refik Bey as the founders of the 
organization, whose members would later be called the “Young Ottomans.”10 Mardin 
states that they were equally concerned to have a profound “knowledge of European 
civilization and [...] at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire,” since almost all of 
them had worked at some stage in the Translation Bureau of the Porte, established in 
1833.11 Thus, their acquaintance with Western ideas allowed them to foresee the spread 
of nationalist ideas among the communities of the Empire. Their aim was “to follow the 
                                                 
6Mardin, Genesis, 14. 
7Karpat, An Inquiry, 86-90; David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London, Frank 
Cass, 1977), 4. 
8For more information about the revolts see Mardin, Genesis, 17-19. 
9Quoted in Mardin, Genesis, 20-21. 




political lead of Europe, though their intense patriotism made them think of reform for 
Ottomans, by Ottomans, and along Islamic lines.”12 
Namık Kemal’s Tasvir-i Efkar (Description of Ideas) and Ali Suavi’s Muhbir 
(Monitor) were the functional organs of the organization that criticized the government’s 
implementation of the Tanzimat. The Cretan insurrection (1866-69) was to be one of the 
most significant events, enabling the Young Ottomans to express their power through a 
press that strongly criticized the government by emphasizing patriotic notions.13 
In 1867, Ittifak-i Hamiyyet declared its program as a new organization under the 
name of New (or Young) Ottoman Society in Paris. The organization headed by Ziya Bey 
was composed of Mustafa Fazıl, Namık Kemal, Nuri, Suavi, Mehmed Bey, Reşad Bey, 
and Rıfat Bey. Suavi’s journal Muhbir was originally the main organ of their society, but 
because of his dissatisfaction with Muhbir, Namık Kemal began to publish Hürriyet 
(Liberty) in 1868.14 The Young Ottomans not only published newspapers and journals, 
but also books, which played an important role in the delivery of ideas embellished with 
patriotic and Islamic elements.15 These publications, however, circulated solely among 
the bureaucratic elites, since the common people could not access the language and 
content of the press. 
Among the Young Ottomans, Şinasi, Ziya Pasha, and Namık Kemal became the 
leaders of the movement because of their contributions “to attempt to develop a broad 
theoretical justification and an ideology for the emerging centralized modern institutions 




15For more information on the journals, newspapers, and other publications of the Young Ottomans, see 
Mardin, Genesis, 45-70. 
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in terms of Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of government.”16 In spite 
of the Tanzimat reforms, new problems in administration, economy, and society 
emerged,17 and the Young Ottomans considered “political liberalization, constitutional 
checks on bureaucratic despotism and a parliamentary system” as suitable solutions.18 
The centralization of the administration, made possible by the reforms, and the 
simultaneous weakening of the power of the ‘ulama increased the level of 
authoritarianism in the administration. The principle of equality resulted in failure 
because it required that the Muslim community should lose its predominance while other 
national communities, non-Muslims acquired extra privileges in social, political, and 
economic spheres such as the reforms made them able to have positions in bureaucracy 
and to serve in the army. The Young Ottomans’ opposition focused on these failures. For 
them, the main reason for the overall failure of the Tanzimat was the abandonment of 
Islamic principles in administration and in the policy of the state because “the doctrine of 
equality […] proclaimed to be equal adherents of religions that were not equal.”19 Their 
goal was to reform the Ottoman Empire on the bases of Islamic principles and religious 
law with imported Western style institutions. The political theory of the Young Ottomans 
was derived from their interpretation of key terms of Islamic ‘political’ vocabulary.20 The 
concepts of Meşveret and Şura (consultation and assembly) were the main concern of the 
                                                 
16Kemal H. Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908” in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), 262. 
17Karpat, “The Transformation,” 262-264. 
18Ömer Taşpınar, Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 42. 
19Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth 
Century” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Jul., 1954), 861. 
20For more a detailed examination, see Mardin, Genesis, 81-106. In this chapter Mardin examines “The 
Islamic Intellectual Heritage of the Young Ottomans.” 
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Young Ottomans in their political theory that required constitutionalism.21 They aimed to 
achieve harmony between Islamic principles and European ideas and institutions in 
administration. Thus, they examined Islamic sources to create an acceptable model for 
the Empire which was coherent with both Islamic and imperial origins.22 Finally, they 
came up with the idea of constitutionalism which aimed at checking the power of the 
Sultan through the ‘ulama and limiting his power with a constitution. Despite the trials of 
innovation in administration, since the Young Ottomans could not achieve mental 
transformation, the social transformation did not bring success for the adaption of 
institutions. As Weiker states, the constitution failed like the other projects, since the 
Young Ottomans could not integrate the ideas that necessarily went along with the 
Western institutions they were implementing in accordance with their understanding of 
classical Islamic doctrine.23 
To sum up, Ottomanism emerged as a counter ideology against what was 
regarded as Western inspired nationalism in order to keep the various ethnic elements 
under the rule of Empire by promoting citizenship based on equal rights regardless of 
race, ethnicity, and religion. The advocates of Ottomanism, the members of Young Turk 
organization, were, as Mardin describes them, the “bureaucratic intelligentsia,”24 who 
were educated in the Translation Office and able to read the works of Western 
intellectuals. Ottomanism was the first trial of the Ottoman Empire to identify its subjects 
in a patriotic sense in order to create an Ottoman nation framed within Western notions of 
                                                 
21Karpat, “Transformation,” 262. 
22Walter F. Weiker, “The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform” in Administrative Science 
Quarterly” Vol. 13, No. 3, Special Issue on Organizations and Social Development, (Dec., 1968), 468. 
23Ibid., 469. 
24See Mardin, Genesis. 
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citizenship; however, it differed from Western nationalism(s) in terms of its emergence, 
goals, characteristics, and results. While the aim of western ideas of nationalism was the 
creation of an independent politically unified nation-state, the goal of Ottomanism was to 
maintain the integrity of both territory and the communities living on it irrespective of 
religion and ethnicity. Ottomanism was a movement that was advocated by the reformer 
intellectuals of the bureaucracy, namely, the Young Ottomans, who advocated their ideas 
through newspapers, journals, and books. They engraved Ottomanism with the religio-
patriotic concepts of vatan (fatherland) and hürriyet (liberty) in their writings. However, 
their concept of liberty called for a government based on constitutional guidelines in 
order to check the authoritarian and despotic tendencies of the throne. Thus, Ottomanism 
remained an intellectual construct and never became a mass movement. In addition to 
low levels of literacy, the common people’s lack of access to the outlets in which these 
ideas circulated explains the absence of strong public support and why the ideology did 
not become a mass movement. On the other hand, almost all the nationalist movements in 
the Balkans, and Armenian nationalism, owed their success to the combined support of 
the peasants, merchants, and clergy,25 as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Also, the Church 
as an institution provided the necessary network within which the nationalist discourses 
could be conveyed to the people. Compared to Western nationalisms, the significant 
deficiency of Ottomanism was that it remained an intellectual movement. The reasons for 
the failure of Ottomanism can be found in the social, political, educational, and economic 
                                                 
25Karpat analyzes the transformation of the Christian Millets, namely, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, and 




spheres.26 While these spheres in Western nations had functioned in collaboration during 
the emergence of national consciousness, the Ottoman Empire had just begun to develop 
its economic, social, and political transformation towards some sort of nationalist vision 
in the late nineteenth century as a “self-defensive reaction.”27Although the independence 
of the Balkan nations caused Ottomanism to end ideologically, the Islamic heritage of 
Ottomanism led Islamism and its central component the Ummah, to emerge as an 
alternative nation-building project. 
 
Islamism 
After the failure of Ottomanism, Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) implemented a new 
ideology, called Islamism or pan-Islamism based on national identification and unity 
between Ottoman Muslims and Muslims throughout the world. There were several 
reasons for Abdulhamid II to launch this project of unification of Muslims. After the 
Russian War (1877-1878) and the 1878 Berlin Treaty, which concluded with the 
independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, as well as the declaring of a semi-
autonomous Bulgaria, many Muslims living within these former Ottoman territories, 
relocated to the Ottoman Empire. The non-Muslims on the other hand, relocated to the 
newly independent states.28 Abdulhamid began to implement Islamism as a two-part 
initiative. The first part was internal and was meant to prevent the rising of national 
consciousness among the Muslim population living in mainland Anatolia, as well as 
those living in the remaining Ottoman territories of the Balkans. As Karpat states, this 
                                                 
26Weiker, “The Ottoman Bureaucracy,” 469. 
27Karpat, An Inquiry, 115. 
28Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the 
Late Ottoman State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 148. 
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emphasis “allowed the ruling bureaucracy to retain the loyalty of the Arabs by stressing 
the Islamic character of the state.”29 The second part was external, and was aimed at 
gaining the support of Muslims living outside the empire. From North Africa to Japan, 
Abdulhamid furthered pan-Islamism by emphasizing his dual position of Caliph and 
Sultan by ruling that all sermons were to be read in his name. Traditionally, the definition 
of Caliph called for the protection of holy cities of Islam and the security of the hajj 
roads, Abdulhamid’s decision to include “the worldwide defense of Islam and of the 
religious rights of Muslims living under foreign occupation”30 became part of this 
definition. Thus he enlarged the borders of unification of all Muslim peoples from Africa 
to the Far East,31 who were suffering from the effects of Western imperialism and 
colonialism. It is worth mentioning that Abdulhamid’s efforts, to unify Muslims under his 
dual role as Caliph and Sultan, had not been used as a political tool for many centuries.32 
As discussed previously, the Young Ottomans’ criticism of the Tanzimat reforms 
was focused primarily on the Western leanings of the reforms, which they considered 
were not compatible with the Empire’s millet order. According to the Young Ottomans, 
the new national policy was to be based on Ottoman-Muslim identity (which was itself 
based on Islamic principles), the cultural and historical heritage of the Empire, and the 
protection of non-Muslims according to Sharia.33 While the ideology of Islamism 
conducted by Abdulhamid II was anti-Western, the theme of the ideology was shaped 
according to European nationalistic characteristics, such as homeland, in a wider attempt 
                                                 
29Karpat, An Inquiry, 107. 
30Karpat, Politicization, 243. 
31Ibid., 232. 
32Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 
1908-1918 (Berkeley: University of California, 1997), 31. 
33Karpat, An Inquiry, 106. 
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to hold the Empire together. 
After the loss of parts of Balkans as a result of the Berlin Treaty, the Empire’s 
main concern became that of securing its mainland and its territories. It is within this 
context, that of the non-Muslim groups, that the Armenians began to express separatist 
tendencies due to the exclusionary politics of Islamism. Islamic unification alone was not 
sufficient enough to keep social integrity among the Ottoman Muslims, and in the early 
twentieth century, growing social differentiation in terms of economic class formation 
and the diversification of language, used both in the official and public spheres, began to 
cause the emergence of ethnic and separatist sentiments, even among the Muslim 
population of the Empire.34 
Because of its religious basis, Islamism, unlike Ottomanism, appealed to the 
common people of the Empire, most of who were Muslim. However, the hegemony of 
the foreign powers over the Muslim societies, such as in India, caused the failure of 
worldwide Muslim unity, or pan-Islamism. The end of Islamism came in 1908 with the 
Young Turks’ seizure of the administration and the ousting of Abdulhamid, whose reign 
was considered widely as absolutist. In addition to the Young Turks, the opposition to 
Abdulhamid’s regime included numerous secret and overt societies and organizations, 
but it was the Young Turks who were more united, more widespread, and displayed the 
strongest opposition. 
 
The Formation of Turkish Nationalism 
The 1908 overthrow of Abdulhamid II by the CUP (the Committee of Union and 
Progress) opened a new page in the history of the Ottoman Empire. As nationalism 




became more widespread in Europe, the Empire first tried to keep its territorial integrity 
by re-identifying its peoples and then exerting efforts to maintain and to strengthen its 
power. After the French Revolution, Ottoman intellectuals who became familiar with 
Western ideas conducted a comprehensive national identification on the basis of Ottoman 
citizenship by emphasizing the Ottoman Empire as homeland. In the Balkans however, 
European nationalism prevailed over Ottomanism. As Mardin argues, the failure of 
Ottomanism “made the Young Turks∗ later turn to a form of Pan-Islamism, but the term 
‘Turk’ had nevertheless acquired a certain legitimacy in the ruling circles even in their 
times.”35 
 
The Young Turks and Turkish Nationalism 
The detailed works of M. Ş. Hanioğlu, F. Ahmad, K. H. Karpat, and Ş. Mardin 
have provided a detailed history of the Young Turk movement.36 Before its existence as a 
political organization, the CUP was established in 1889 under the name of İttihad-ı 
Osmanlı Cemiyeti (Society of Ottoman Unity) by four students of the Royal Medical 
School in Istanbul, Abdullah Cevdet, İbrahim Temo, İshak Sukuti, and Çerkez Mehmet 
Reşit.37 This organization was secretive in nature and would be the nucleus of the Young 
                                                 
 
∗Even the use of the term “Young Turks” is vague, Mardin here uses the term instead of Young Ottomans. 
35Şerif Mardin, Ethnocentrism, Islam and the Development of Turkish Nationalism (Ankara: Monograph, 
1966), 17. 
36See for detailed studies on the genesis of the Young Turk movement M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young 
Turks in Opposition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks (Great 
Britain: Oxford University Press, 1969); Kemal H. Karpat, Politicization of Islam; Şerif Mardin, The 
Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks, Istanbul: Robert College School of Administration 
and Economics, 1969; and Şerif Mardin, “19. yy’da Düşünce Akımları ve Osmanlı Devleti (Ideologies and 
the Ottoman State in the 19th Century),” Tanzimat’tan Günümüze Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopedia 
of Turkey: from Tanzimat to Present), Vol. 2, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985. 
37The first two names are extensively given as the founders/leaders of the organization. See Karpat, 
Politicization, 354; Hanioğlu, Young Turks, 18. However, Zurcher and Ramsaur also mention the last two 
names as the founders of the movement. See Erik Jan Zurcher, The Unionist Factor: The Role of the 




The Young Turk movement was established on the basis of positivist ideas led by 
Abdullah Cevdet and İbrahim Temo, and its ideology “was originally ‘scientific,’ 
materialist, social Darwinist, elitist, and vehemently antireligious;”39 and its transition to 
the political level had been achieved by its successful interaction and alliance with the 
various opposition groups to the Abdulhamid regime. This transition however caused the 
original Young Turk ideology to “lose its purity.”40 
In the years following the formation of the CUP, the movement experienced 
several transformations both within its ideology and among its members. Hanioğlu 
mentions the relationship of the Young Turk movement with other opposition groups 
such as the Freemasons, Le Parti Constitutionnel en Turquie, Le Comité Turco-Syrien, 
Cemiyet-i İlmiye (the Society of the ‘Ulama), and high-ranking officials and governors.41 
The relationship between the Young Turk movement and other opposition groups vis-à-
vis the Abdulhamid regime demonstrated the desire of Young Turks to be involved in 
Ottoman politics.  
Because its founding members were from various ethnic backgrounds, Abdullah 
Cevdet a Kurd, and Ibrahim Temo an Albanian,42 Turkish ethnic identification was not 
the defining element of the CUP. Hanioğlu points to this controversy by stating that 
“none of the founders of the CUP was of Turkish origin, and they represented the 
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important Muslim groups in which a strong sense of nationalism was yet to develop—
Albanians, Kurds, and Circassians,” which reaffirms my earlier point on the lack of 
ethnic substance in the construction of Turkishness.43 
The founding members’ relationships with their ethnic groups, in addition to the 
increasing number of Turks in the movement, caused the emergence of internal 
opposition.44 As a result of this internal opposition and in order to avoid the potential for 
increased ethnic fragmentation, the Young Turks organized a meeting known as the First 
Congress of Ottoman Opposition in Paris in 1902. Although the decisions made at the 
meeting put an end to the original structures of the CUP, some elements within the 
movement remained operating under the existing organizational frameworks, using the 
party’s name, operating as well, within a different ideology than that of the original 
CUP.45 According to Hanioğlu, the role of this meeting is “pivotal in the history of the 
CUP” and its actions caused deep fractures among the members as well as within the 
ideology of the organization.46 At the Congress, the two opposing wings of the CUP, 
debated the necessity of foreign intervention. The first group was the majority, and 
consisted of Turks, Armenians, Albanians, and Greeks, all of whom identified with their 
respective ethnicities. The composition of the minority group, which was led by Ahmed 
Rıza (1859-1930), a Kurd, was primarily Muslim.47 Because of the conflicting 
approaches, political expectations, and differing ethnic identities, the Young Turk 
movement could not present a systematic ideology of Turkish nationalism, and the 
                                                 







meeting resulted in the disintegration of the CUP and in the emergence of an allied 
organization consisting of two groups, Turkish nationalists and Ahmed Rıza’s group, 
which would keep the control of the Young Turk movement.48 
Given these internal conditions and in order to find a suitable solution for the 
survival of the Empire, Yusuf Akçura developed a systematical way to approach Turkish 
nationalism by comparing and contrasting Ottomanism and Islamism in a sense similar to 
that of European nationalism. 
 
Turkish Nationalism as an Ideology: Akçura and Gökalp 
Turkish nationalism emerged not from a single stream, but from the various 
factions within the Young Turk Movement. As mentioned above, even the early structure 
of the Young Turk movement consisted of various ethnic members, including Albanians, 
Kurds, Circassians, as well as different organizations and groups that had contradictory 
world-views. When the movement became a nationalist current, it gained support from 
other Turkish factions, namely Azeris and Tatars. Although Ahmet Ağaoğlu, an Azeri, 
contributed greatly to Turkish nationalism, it was the Tatar faction led by İsmail Gaspıralı 
and Yusuf Akçura, that played the major role, not only in the emergence of the Turkish 
nationalism, but also in the development of Turkish intellectuality. 
In order to find the most appropriate policy for the Empire, given circumstances, 
Akçura compared and contrasted between Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism in terms 
of their weaknesses and strengths, within the framework of Turkish nationalism, and as a 
solution for the Empire.49 What made Akçura important in the construction of Turkish 
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nationalism was his call for the establishment of national consciousness.50 Because 
Akçura remained between Islamism and Turkish nationalism, his Three Ways of Politics 
should not be seen as the manifesto of Turkish nationalism; instead, it was a first attempt 
at a systematic creation of Turkish nationalism on the political rather than on the 
scientific level.  
Although Akçura stressed the strong points of Ottomanism, such as the ability of 
the Empire to maintain its millet system and its territory under one rule, he mentioned 
five reasons for the failure of Ottomanism. While he considered Ottomanism as a type of 
melting pot, Akçura claimed that it would fail under its promise to grant all Ottoman 
subjects equal rights and representation. Granting equal citizenship to all Ottoman 
subjects, specifically in the Balkans, was also discouraged by Russia, as it would 
eliminate the non-Muslim communities’ dependence on Russia and lead to the loss of 
Russian access to specific trade routes over the Mediterranean Sea. Equal citizenship was 
also discouraged by other European Christian countries, out of fear that they would lose 
their connections and authority over the Ottoman Christian communities.51 
Although Islamism was intended to unify Muslims across the world under the 
Ottoman Caliph, Akçura outlined its strengths and weaknesses pertaining to the 
continuation of the Empire. Akçura considered Abdulhamid’s Islamism as a leading 
cause of friction between the various Muslim and non-Muslim peoples, as well as 
between Turkish Muslims and non-Muslim Turks.52 Furthermore, the unification of 
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Muslims did not necessarily constitute religious harmony, as history has revealed the 
existence of conflicts even among the different sects of Islam.53 While Akçura believed 
that Islam could overcome this problem by confronting external obstacles, such as 
European imperialism and colonialism, he did not foresee any chance for confronting 
Europe successfully under the given circumstances.54 
In his final examination, Akçura suggested Turkism, under Ottoman auspices, as 
the ideal method of establishing nationhood, as it would unify all Turkish and Turkified 
Muslims of the Empire, as well as the Turkish population living in Central Asia and 
Russia.55 Akçura predicted, however, that Turkish unification would result in the 
ostracism of the non-Turk and non-Turkifiable Muslim elements within the Turkish 
Muslim communities, but because the majority of Turkish population was already 
Muslim, the problem could be ignored. Through a reinterpretation of Islam, which would 
allow Muslims to identify themselves based on their national identities, as Christians had 
done in Russia, Germany, England, and some other European countries, Islam could 
provide a common base for the unification of Turks.56 
An important component of Akçura’s examination was the social role of Islam in 
the formation of national identity in Turkish society. According to Akçura, even though 
religions have been a less important factor in the formation of political units, they have 
played a crucial role in the socialization of people. Since the majority of the Turkish 
population is Muslim, Akçura argued, Islam would be the uniting element and would be 
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the most important element in the formation of Turkish nation-state.57 In order for this 
unification to occur, however, Islam would have to be reinterpreted as a receptor of 
nationalism. 
In Akçura’s reinterpretation of Islam, races have supplanted the position of 
religions in social and political spheres, and furthermore, religion had become more 
individualistic. In order for religions to maintain their power within society, as 
Christianity had done, “religions could save their social and political importance by 
integrating with races, and by helping and serving races.”58 
In addition to his Three Ways of Politics, Akçura published articles in many 
journals and newspapers. He also founded organizations such as Turkish Hearth and 
Turkish Society, which advocated Turkish nationalism through his journal, Turkish 
Homeland.59 In his writings, he advocated the simplification of the Turkish language, the 
spread of national culture, and the rewriting of Turkish history in order to create national 
consciousness. For example, his criticism of the newspaper Türk was based on what he 
perceived to be its limited understanding of national history. It was Akçura’s belief that 
Turkish national history should not be limited to the Ottoman Empire, but should include 
the early Turkish states and their heroes such as Oğuz, Cengiz, Timur, etc.60 
Although there was an ongoing development of a Turkish national consciousness 
with racist tendencies, inspired by positivism, and a rejection of religious and cultural 
elements of the society, Akçura was the first intellectual to frame Turkish nationalism as 
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political project, reproducing and explaining nationalistic terminology more effectively 
than Namık Kemal did,61 and because the Young Ottomans, Islamists, and Akçura saw 
Islam as the common ground for their ideologies, their ideas often overlap. 
Having been a member of the oppressed Muslim Kazan Tatars of the Russian 
Empire, led Akçura to believe that territory, religion, and ethnicity could be combined in 
the creation of a national identity. In what Yavuz calls the “trinity” of “Islamic identity, 
ethnicity, and territoriality” were shaped by the “external challenges and internal 
developments” of the Russian Empire.62 Islam however, was the central component of 
this trinity since it fed on nationalistic and territorial symbols.63 
Because Akçura’s impact on the formation of Turkish nationalism can be found in 
the context of the modern Turkish state, the state emerged on the basis of Islamic 
identity, integrated with Turkish ethnicity and territory, and blessed with Islamic symbols 
such as vatan. In effect, I would say that Akçura produced an eclectic ideology derived 
from Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. By advocating the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, he admitted the failure of Ottomanism as a political movement, while 
remaining between Islamism and Turkish nationalism. 
In addition to Akçura’s contribution to the development of Turkish nationalism, 
Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), who labeled his ideology as “a modern Islamic Turkishness,”64 
exposed the manifesto and theory of Turkish nationalism. Because his educational 
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background was both religious and Western, his intellectual life was deeply profound.65 
Gökalp read Gabriel Tarde, a French sociologist, who Hilmi Ziya Ülken attributes as 
Gökalp’s greatest influence. Ülken describes Gökalp as one of the intellectuals who 
combined the major currents (Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism) and produced a 
nationalistic view suitable for the Empire.66 As a sociologist, Gökalp was able to read the 
reactions of the masses, and his knowledge of both classical Islamic teachings and 
philosophy as well as his knowledge of Western-based positivist sciences and 
philosophy, and the social results of current political discourses, led him to form an 
appropriate understanding of nationalism. 
According to Wyndham Deedes, Gökalp “was one, perhaps the most influential, 
of the spiritual founders of the Turkish Republic,”67 and his contributions to Turkish 
nationalism included a simplification of the Turkish language, the stress on the social role 
of Islam for the mobilization and motivation of the masses toward ethno-cultural 
nationalism, an emphasis on Turkish history, culture, literature, and art through mass 
education, and the attempt to create a national economy. 
At this point it is necessary to discuss some of the core elements of Gökalp’s 
ideology. In Gökalp’s terminology, the most important concepts are nation (millet), 
culture (hars), and civilization (medeniyet).∗ Nation, as defined by Gökalp, did not 
constitute a group of people defined by racial, tribal, geographical, political, or volitional 
attributes, rather he defined nation as a group of people who share a common language, 
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belief/religion, ethics, and aesthetics, in other words, a society of which members have 
received the same terbiye∗ (education or cultivation).68 
In order to explain culture, Gökalp used two different concepts: hars and 
medeniyet, and discussed their commonalities, which included all social aspects of life, 
namely, religion, ethics, law, philosophy, aesthetics, economy, language, and science. 
The differentiation between hars and medeniyet is that while hars means a national unity 
of cultural elements, medeniyet refers to an international dimension of culture.69 As an 
example, while each European nation has its own culture, these nations constitute a 
Western civilization characterized by a transcendental culture. According to this 
definition, Gökalp defines Turkish culture in terms of its essence, a Turkish nation that is 
also a member of an Islamic civilization, contributing to and receiving from the cultural 
interaction of this civilization. For example, while the Turkish language is strictly the 
product of Turkish culture, the Ottoman language, the official language of the Ottoman 
Empire, is a reflection of the languages of Islamic civilization, i.e., Turkish, Arabic, and 
Persian.70 
Gökalp’s ideology stressed hars as a national element and medeniyet as a 
universal element. In order to create the ideology of a Turkish nation-state, he ephasized 
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hars as an embodiment of the Turkish language, culture, history, and the nationalist 
version of Islam. For Gökalp, the most important element of hars was language, which, 
as he claimed, allowed people to make connections with others and with their own 
culture. In the case of the Turkish language, however, it was divided between the public 
and elite spheres, and further divided, as its spoken and written forms were entirely 
different from each other. While the spoken version was used in the public sphere by all 
sections of society, the written version, Osmanlı Türkçesi (Ottoman Turkish), was used 
specifically among the elite. For Gökalp, the simplification and generalization of the 
spoken language was necessary to achieve this effect, because conveying the ideology of 
nationalism to the public was critical.71 
As a sociologist influenced by the French thinkers Fouillée, Tarde, Le Bon, and 
Durkheim,72 Gökalp was able to envision a Turkish nation-state along the lines of 
rationalist thinking, in which culture, language, and history were essential elements for 
social unity and national reawakening. In order to extend social unity to national unity, 
Gökalp stressed religion as an integral component. Gökalp, like Akçura, considered 
religion as the social base in the development of a single national attachment. Because of 
existing and intertwined connections between Islam and the cultural, social, and daily 
lives of Turks, Gökalp believed that Islam would remain as the core element of Turkish 
nationalism.  
While Gökalp’s ideology was shaped by Western thinkers, he was also influenced 
by Sufism, namely the Nakşibendi school, and he read classical Islamic philosophers and 
thinkers such as al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina, Farabi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn ‘Arabi, and Jalal ud-Din 
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Rumi.73 Gökalp’s intellectual duality, consisting of Western and Eastern thought, gave 
him a modern understanding of Islam. While historically, Muslims could self identify 
only along the lines of their faith, rather than their ethnicity, Gökalp believed that 
Muslims could identify with their nationalities, making religion compatible with 
nationalism, not only with Turkish nationalism, but with all nations of Islam.74 In order to 
demonstrate this compatibility, he recalled from the Quran “in God all people have a 
guide”75 and “we have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know 
one another.”76 By referring to these verses, Gökalp advocated nationalism as a means of 
preserving the religious and national identities of Muslim people, as well their social 
independences.77 
Gökalp’s approach to nationalism was two-fold. First, he described nationalism as 
“social yeast” that caused people to rise, resulting in the disintegration of nations.78 
According to Gökalp, the concept of nationality gave rise to national consciousnesses 
separate from that of the Empire. In his second approach, Gökalp described nationalism 
as a “weapon” used for the development of the Islamic world.79 In Gökalp’s rationale, by 
gaining national consciousness, non-Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire 
had acquired their independence; therefore, Muslim communities under the rule of non-
Muslim governments elsewhere should also strive to achieve an Islamic identity through 
the same means in order to achieve worldwide unity.  
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While Gökalp stressed the importance of language in the development of national 
consciousness, he also stressed language as the means of obtaining political 
independence.80 Language, according to Gökalp, was a key to national literature, history, 
and culture, and he advocated the vernacularization of religious language. In his 
Programme of Turkism, he discussed “religious Turkism” by putting emphasis on the 
Turkification of prayers.81 
Gökalp attributed the backwardness of the Empire to the failures of governmental 
administrators to understand the importance of nationality,82 and insisted that the Empire 
could rise to the same level as that of modern Western societies. In order to reach the 
level of the West, Gökalp emphasized the necessity of modernization and nationalization 
of institutions, a revival of national art, a reawakening of national history and culture, a 
reformation of education with national leanings, a modern reinterpretation of Islam, and 
the nationalization of the economy.  
Gökalp defined Turkish nationalism in terms of language and Islam, and 
furthermore, it was not based on ethnicity, but it was cultural and voluntary. According to 
Gökalp, any individual living within Turkish society was to be considered a Turk 
regardless of ethnic origin.83 Gökalp believed that this transformation would be gradual, 
and would succeed by educating the masses with a nationalized program,84 through 
creating a middle-class,85 and adopting industrialization.86 And while Gökalp argued that 
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to finalize this transformation required cooperation with Western civilization,87 this 
cooperation was to remain limited in terms of science and technology.88 
 
The Characteristics of Turkish Nationalism 
Akçura and Gökalp were the most important figures in the formation and 
development of Turkish nationalism, and their first concern was Turkification and the 
purification of language. In his efforts to purify the language, Gökalp contributed 
publications containing Turkish syntax, grammar, and original vocabulary.89 Both men 
believed that language was the best way to transform the common people in a broader 
effort to revive national consciousness. Both men also believed that an emphasis on 
Turkish culture and history was an integral component in forming a national 
consciousness. 
Because Akçura and Gökalp were concerned that a new nationally identified state 
could be based on Islam, they both claimed that Islam and nationalism supported to each 
other. While Akçura referred to Afghani’s ideas that nationalism could help Islam 
thrive,90 Gökalp derived the compatibility of Islam and nationalism from the Quran. For 
Akçura, Islam was the root of identity, ethnicity, and territoriality.91 For Gökalp, this 
formulation was “a modern Islamic Turkishness.”92 Although Akçura and Gökalp’s ideas 
of nationalism were based in part on Islam, both men called for a secular state in which 
even the religious language was reformulated into that of the vernacular.  
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Although attempts were made to spread the ideology of nationalism among the 
common people, the arguments and discussions about Turkish nationalism and its place 
in society remained limited to the elites and literati.93 And while there was an increase in 
the number of publications, journals, and newspapers, there was no significant evidence 
that they reached the common people. Even after the declaration of the Turkish Republic 
in 1923, the records of the Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) meetings in 1924 reveal that 
the main points of Turkish nationalism, such as the limits and coverage of Turkish 
identity and the ways of reaching the common people, were not finalized and remained 
open to discussion.  
The different approaches and understandings of nationalism which emerged after 
the Balkan Wars (1912-13) played a role in the diversification of the Young Turk 
movement. There existed three main ideological streams within the movement. The 
“Unionists,” an offshoot of the CUP, embraced positivist thought. The second group, led 
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, consisted of former “Unionists” who came from the military 
and civil bureaucracy. The third group was composed of members of the Ottomanist 
‘ulama and liberal government officials from Istanbul, all of which were opponents of the 
nationalists and Unionists and believed that Ottoman society was obligated to support the 
sultan-caliph.94 
While there was no agreement on the exact definition of Turkish nationalism, 
which would have provided the necessary ideological basis for mobilizing and motivating 
the population to fight for Turkey against its perceived enemies, mainly during WWI and 
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the subsequent War of Independence, there remains the question of what mobilized the 
diverse ethnic peoples (i.e., Circassians, Laz, Kurds, Arabs, and Turks) and led them to 
confront Armenian rebellions in Eastern Anatolia. While European nationalist sentiments 
spread to the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, leading to their increased call for 
separation, the Ottoman Empire was able to maintain its legitimacy among its Muslim 
population, mainly that of its Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Bosnians, and Macedonians. 
This may indicate that the Ottoman Empire’s legitimacy among these communities was 
maintained under the notion that the lands were Islamic, the Sultan was the Caliph of all 
Muslims, and the Ottoman Empire was the Dar’ul-Islam.  
Because Islam provided the social fabric, Turkish nationalism based on ethnic 
lines did not work in the Ottoman Muslim society. Defined within an ethno-Turkish 
national framework, the establishment of the Turkish nation state resulted in the 
exclusion of other ethnicities, leading to a widening of Kurdish dissent and further 
rebellions.95 Because the common cultural heritage of Ottoman Muslim society was 
based on Islam, members of the Kurdish ‘ulama such as Said Nursi (1878-1960), 
advocated the priority of religious identity and defined nationalism as a social illness.96 
Ottomanism and Islamism were the first attempts to define the essence of the 
Empire. While Ottomanism brought equality to the people with the promise of 
citizenship, it aimed to create an Ottoman society based on the cultural heritage of the 
Ottomans. As the administration made efforts to enrich this cultural heritage by modeling 
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social and governmental institutions along Western lines, the incompatibility between 
Western mentality and the Islamic essence of Ottoman society resulted in the failure of 
Ottomanism. This failure stands in contrast to the regime of Abdulhamid II, which 
enforced modernization in both the social and political levels by applying it with both 
Islamic meaning and spirit.97 After coming to power, the Young Turk movement did not 
attempt to change existing Islamic social attachments and there were numerous reasons 
for keeping this continuity, such as the Balkan Wars, WWI, and the War of 
Independence, all of which required spiritual unity among ethnically different people. 
Thus, an ethnically defined nationalism could never gain acceptance and furthermore, it 
harmed religious unity. Instead of embracing ethnic nationalism, the Young Turks 
embraced a cultural nationalism based largely on Islamic heritage and elements of 
Turkishness. While Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism moved on an Islamic 
line, each came to incorporate a specific characteristic. In other words, Ottomanism was 
an ideology based on the Empire’s Islamic heritage as well as privileges to non-Muslims. 
Islamism was the politicization of Islam in an effort to keep the integrity of the Empire 
and to unify all Muslims. By placing Islam at the forefront of society and including non-
Turkish Muslims, Turkish nationalism became an all-encompassing ideology that 
allowed the Empire to maintain its remaining territorial integrity. 
 
 
97Karpat, Politicization, 223-224. 
  
CHAPTER II 
THE ROLE OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH IN THE 
FORMATION OF ARMENIAN NATIONALISM 
Introduction: Characteristics of Armenian Nationalism 
“Armenian patriotism and the Armenian 
Church have always been identified.”98 
Armenian nationalism emerged in the early nineteenth century as a result of 
external rather than internal factors. In the construction of this particular nationalism, 
territorial affiliation, with its notions of a fixed homeland, played a central role for the 
Armenians. The loss of control over the Armenian territories in 1375 placed the 
Armenian community under the control of various later empires such as the Safavids, 
Persians, Ottomans, and Czarist Russia. The Armenian homeland, once united, was 
divided among different foreign powers. While Armenian territory was carved up by 
these imperial powers, the struggle between the powers opened up opportunity spaces for 
Armenians to contest imperial rule and articulate their own communal and, later, 
nationalist claims. On a more discursive level, Armenian notions of homeland, or lack 
thereof, i.e., Armenian dispersion, had found expressions in religious thought, which later 
buttressed the construction of a nationalist discourse that tied together diverse Armenian 
communities. 
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This study, which assesses the role of the Armenian Church and clergy in the 
construction of Armenian nationalism, borrows its theoretical framework from Anthony 
D. Smith, the revisionist scholar of nationalism. Smith highlighted the primacy of 
symbols, myths and narratives, as elements of a common culture that dominate the 
discourses of nationalisms. In Smith’s own words, “what gives nationalism its power are 
the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages…” and, through these 
ethnic symbols, “modern national identities are reconstituted in each generation, as the 
nation becomes more inclusive and as its members cope with new challenges.”99 In 
addition to the formative impact of cultural reservoirs, Smith also pays due attention to 
collective experiences of ethnicities and their contribution to the emergence of the 
nation.100 This theoretical framework fits the Armenian case as the Armenian religious 
institution not only provided a network for the circulation of ideas across separate 
communities, but also emphasized a narrative of national origins that utilized the themes 
of dispersion and of victimization. 
Historically speaking, the Armenian Church and its clergy strove to protect the 
Armenian community under reigns of foreign powers and, accordingly, they did not 
openly or strongly advocate pro-independence ideas.101 However, the attitude of the 
Church toward national freedom changed in the nineteenth century. For instance, 
Nalbandian argued that 
[t]he political and diplomatic ferment was translated into patriotic feeling among 
the Armenians. A great nationalistic fervor was felt, especially among the youth 
who lived outside of the Turkish provinces. Patriarch Varzhabedian and Khrimian 
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Hairig spurred the younger generation to interest themselves in the homeland in 
Turkish Armenia.102 
Thus, the Armenian clergy in the second half of the nineteenth century started 
advocating the principle of nationalism and encouraged patriotism among the Armenian 
youth. 
The clergy’s embrace of nationalism coincided significantly with the Tanzimat 
era. In the face of the weakening of the Empire, Selim III launched a set of institutional 
reforms borrowed from the West. Murad II carried on the reforms called Tanzimat 
Fermanı (the Declaration of Regulations). In 1839, he extended their framework to 
encompass secular spheres, including the “economic, political, judicial, and educational 
institutions” with the declaration of Gulhane Hatt-ı Humayun.103 A new set of reforms 
called Islahat Fermanı followed the Tanzimat Fermanı in 1856.104 The Islahat Fermanı 
brought more secular innovations and warrants for the non-Muslim millets in the name of 
Ottoman citizenship. This new identity of the Ottoman would mean that the superiority of 
the Muslims had come to an end.105 
Even when the clergy did not openly support the cause of Armenian nationalism, 
what mattered was the perception of the clerical institution in the eyes of the nationalists. 
Chakmakjian, for example, indicates that “[t]he Catholicos of the Armenians, the 
Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, the Catholicos of Cilicia, and the Armenian 
Church, should have given wise guidance to the Armenians [in times of political crises], 
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but they, too, had been identified with the national aspirations.”106 The Armenian 
Orthodox Church and Armenian identity were the bonds that held together the diverse 
Armenian communities. 
Undoubtedly, the contribution of the millet system of the Ottoman Empire to the 
preservation of religious, and thus communal, identities could not be denied. The millet 
system of the Empire provided a framework of tolerance for the millets that were 
officially recognized as a legitimate part of Ottoman society. In a sense, this was an 
application of Sharia, under which the people of the book, i.e., the Jews and Christians, 
were to be protected. In this context of Ottoman social structures, the religious leaders, 
who exercised their authority upon their respective millets, were the official 
representatives of non-Muslim communities, as they negotiated, and at times clashed, 
with the Ottoman state for further rights or for the preservation of already-gained 
privileges. The Armenian case was not an exception, as the Patriarchate provided 
political and religious guidance to his people. What makes the Armenian case interesting, 
however, is that the notion of “one religion, one nation” combined the ethnic and 
religious markers of identity, and further strengthened the Armenian community.  
In the examination of Armenian nationalism, it becomes clear that primordial 
attachments to identities such as language, culture, territory and a distinct form of 
Christianity, as embodied in the Apostolic Armenian Church (Gregorian Church), played 
an important role in emphasizing a mythological Armenian identity. Peter Rutland holds 
that Armenian nationalism has a sense of territory which has been designated historically 
by the Armenians as the homeland since the early ages of Armenian history, which is 
                                                 




characterized by oppression, tragic migrations and constant attempts at returning to the 
homeland.107 This particular historical memory was kept alive by the dominance of a 
shared religion and language. Albert Hourani has argued that 
territorial patriotism, a sense of community with all who shared the same defined 
piece of land, rooted in love for that land itself… where that region had relatively 
clear boundaries and an unbroken tradition of separate administrative or political 
existence.108 
In the case of Armenian nationalism, as Khachig Tololyan clearly shows, the 
ideas of dispersion, embellished in both religious and secular terms, consolidated the 
Armenians who lived in separate diaspora communities. While the Armenians who lived 
in their homeland under foreign power protested injustices and inequalities within the 
limits of a socio-political hierarchy, the diasporian discourse of dispersion sharply 
differed in that it “envisaged the Armenians not simply as a series of religious 
communities but as a collectivity that could become a nation.”109 In the dissemination of 
similar discourses, vernacular literature played a significant role to the extent that 
Toloyan calls it the “textual nation.”110 
One can claim that there are certain stages in the construction of Armenian 
nationalism. The first and basic demonstration of these national aspirations was 
Armenian patriotism as expressed by religious figures and secular intellectuals. In 
accordance with discursive networks of communal identity, Armenian patriotism 
associated the land with the people. On a second level, the occupation of Armenian 
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territory by foreign rulers brought forward notions of a mythical national spirit, struggle 
and national independence. Aspects of religion, literature, art and politics played a part in 




The Armenian Church and the Ottoman Armenians 
In the traditional hierarchy of the Armenian Church, the symbolic leader of 
Armenians is called Catholicos. Historically speaking, the Catholicate of Echmiadzin has 
an important and symbolic position for Armenians and the institution is recognized as the 
highest authority in the Armenian Church. In its history, this Catholicate had to move 
from Echmiadzin to Sis (Cilicia) and then Akhtamar (Akdamar) because of political 
pressures. During the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Church had two more patriarchates, 
that of Istanbul and of Jerusalem. The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul was the legal 
representative of the Armenian millet and the highest authority of the Armenian Church 
in the eyes of the Ottoman Sultan. 
The Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, established by Mehmed II in 1461, was 
the head of the Ottoman Armenians and was responsible for their social, economic, 
religious and political affairs. Thus, within the millet system of the Empire, this socio-
political framework helped the Armenian Church integrate its ecclesiastical duties with 
political ones. Unlike Catholic and Orthodox millets in the Ottoman lands, the Armenian 
millet referred to both a religious and an ethnic identity that remained limited the 
religious division of Ottoman Armenians into Gregorian, Protestant and Catholic sects, as 
a result of a growing missionary presence, which sought the conversion of the different 
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sects of Christianity in the East. Therefore, the activities of Catholic and Protestant 
missions from the early nineteenth century onwards created the first major religious 
separation among the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. This struggle for faith can 
be traced back to an earlier point in the history of Christianity in the East. The Church 
gained its authority after the official acceptance of Christianity in the early fourth 
century.111 By claiming itself as the first Christian community, the Armenian Church 
sought legitimacy among the other Christian communities. From this point onwards, we 
see a competition between the Roman Catholic Church and the Armenian Church, 
reflected by the missionary activities of the modern era. By the 1850s, the missionaries 
had achieved considerable successes, and, the Ottoman Empire also recognized a 
Protestant millet (which a number of Armenians adhered to). Catholic Armenians were 
represented by the Catholic Patriarchate.  
The divisions within the Ottoman Armenians were not limited to religious 
affiliation. While smaller Armenian communities had been living in Western Anatolia, 
the rest of the Ottoman Armenian population was concentrated in the eastern provinces of 
Anatolia. This demographic make-up largely determined the socio-economic status of the 
Ottoman Armenians. The Armenians of the Western Anatolia, especially of Istanbul and 
Izmir, came to enjoy higher economic and social status in urban centers, while the 
Eastern Armenians, who lived predominantly in rural lands, depended on farming and 
small-scale trade for their livelihoods. In terms of pre-modern class formation, the 
Armenian population was divided into four classes: the clergy, the Amira, the Esnaf, and 
the peasant. While the Amira class consisted of tax collectors, moneylenders, bankers and 
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civil servants in the Empire, and enjoyed warm relations with the Sultanate, the Esnaf 
class mostly consisted of merchants, small-scale traders and some intellectuals. 
The French Revolution contributed to the consolidation of nationalist aspirations 
across the world by setting a successful example of a bottom-up revolution, and the 
currents of change affected the Ottoman world as well. The Ottoman Armenians, as well 
as other ethnic groups regardless of their religious affiliations, started developing 
schemes to secede from the Ottoman state. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 came 
to a conclusion with the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, which was replaced by the Treaty 
of Berlin later that year. These treaties strengthened Ottoman suspicions of the 
revolutionary activities of the non-Muslim millets, which were later coined in 
international diplomacy as Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian and Albanian Question(s).112 
The economic, military and political weakening of the Ottoman Empire induced 
the empire to find solutions. The interventions of foreign powers in the internal affairs of 
the Empire, combined with the French Revolution, pushed the Empire to set up 
innovations and reforms in the political, social, educational and military fields in order to 
avoid collapse. These reforms brought privileges to both foreign powers and millets. 
Russia, England and France acquired the rights to intervene in the empire’s internal 
affairs after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. 
 
Missionary Activities 
One of the significant reasons for the emergence of the Armenian conflict in the 
Ottoman Empire was missionary activity. The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca allowed Russia 
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to become a protectorate over the Orthodox Christian Church.113 Following this, the 
Catholic Church came under the protection of the French ambassador in Istanbul.114 
However, according to Artinian, the Catholic Church’s missionary activities over the 
Armenian Patriarchate had begun in the first decades of the seventeenth century.115 
In contrast, Protestant missionary activity was first seen in the 1830s, and rapidly 
spread among the Armenians.116 The first protestant missionaries to Anatolia were 
Americans. The active role of France and Russia in Eastern Turkey led England to 
participate in the politics in the region. With this aspiration, in order to intervene in the 
internal Ottoman politics, England sent missionaries into the region, established schools, 
and erected churches.117 The Armenians, with Greeks, were the prior target of 
Protestantization.118 The missionaries encouraged the Armenians first to become 
Protestant and secondly to establish an independent Armenian state.119 
The common point of all missionary activities was to plant the idea of 
independence among the Armenians. The concentration of missionary activities in 
Eastern Turkey, where the Armenian population was relatively dense, could not be 
explained as a coincidence. The idea of independence would bring two possible 
outcomes: independence or revolt. In the case of the realization of the first, Russia, 
France and England would claim a protectorate over the religious communities of their 
respective agents. In the case of the second outcome, the powers would have the right of 
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intervention in Ottoman internal affairs. Both outcomes would be in favor of the powers. 
The missionary activities caused internal conflict within Ottoman society by 
raising awareness in young Armenians through European education in the missionary 
schools. This rise of nationalist ideas occurred next to decline of the patriarchate 
authority over the Armenians. These were the major reasons for the emergence of the 
Armenian nationalism; however, the missionary activities can be explained only by the 
regional politics and demands of Russia, France and England. 
 
The Eastern Policies of Russia and England 
Although the missionary activities were a tool for Russia, England and France to 
realize their demands over the Middle East, the activities became a turning point for the 
Armenians. The emergence of the Armenian issue in the Ottoman Empire was born as a 
result of Russian political encroachment on the region of Eastern Turkey.120 The first 
Russian-Armenian relations can be traced to 1723-1724, when Russia captured Caucasia. 
The relations were based on commercial and educational treaties between the Russians 
and the small Armenian groups living in the region.121 Russia initially began to train 
young Armenians to serve as military officers. Later, Russia opened institutes and 
schools for the general education of Armenians in order to launch a political movement 
against the Ottoman Empire.122 Russia’s efforts were largely successful among the 
Armenians living in Iran and the Ottoman Empire. In the Turkish-Russian War of 1828-
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1829, the Armenians provided voluntary assistance to the Russian troops in the region.123 
The same scenario was repeated in the War of Crimea in 1854-1855.124 During this 
period, many Armenians migrated from Ottoman lands to Russia.125 
In the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878, the Armenian officers educated by 
Russia fought in the Russian lines against the Ottomans. However, the most significant 
impact of the Armenian officers’ involvement in the Russian army was the participation 
in Russian military activities by the Armenians who lived in Ottoman territory.126 The 
Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia on 
the 3rd of March 1878, was a critical point in terms of the status of the Armenians of the 
Empire. Article 16 was added because of the demand made by the Armenian officials of 
the Ottoman government, Stefan Aslanyan Pasha and Ohannes Nuryan Efendi, who 
represented the Patriarchate.127 The article stated that: 
In Armenia (Ermenistan)…, the Ottoman government would guarantee to 
immediately enforce modernization and reforms in the provinces where 
Armenians live in, and to protect them from the attacks of Kurds and 
Circassian.128 
With the treaty, “Armenia” and “Armenians” entered the international sphere for 
the first time.129 Russia, in compliance with the Treaty, would intervene in the Empire’s 
internal affairs. Due to the objection of Austria and England, the Treaty never got off the 
ground, and a new multilateral treaty was signed in Berlin on the 13th of July, 1878. 
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These external contexts partially explain the emergence of the Armenian question, 
but the Ottoman Armenians were not simply the receptacles of imperial aspirations. 
Scholars who have focused on the tragic events and massacres within the context of the 
Great War continued to fail to provide a framework for the internal dynamics of the 
emergence of Armenian nationalism. It is to this subject that we now return. 
 
The Role of Religion in the Construction of Armenian Nationalism 
This study argues that the turning point of Armenian nationalism is found in the 
changing attitudes of the clergy towards Armenian independence during the nineteenth 
century. Accordingly, the clergy started promoting the principles of self-rule instead of an 
attitude of cooperation with a foreign power such as Russia. This intellectual and 
ecclesiastical shift has earlier roots. The Mekhitharist Congregation, founded by 
Mekhithar in Istanbul in 1701, moved to Morea in 1703 and then to Venice in 1715, was 
a group of Armenian Catholic monks who were focusing on the rationale of the European 
enlightenment.130 Exemplifying the first signs of “a cultural and religious revival among 
Armenians,” Mekhitharists put an emphasis on Armenian history, language and literature 
through “periodicals, printing, translations, a network of schools, and painstaking; and 
also provided the Armenian people to engage with the Western ideas.”131 The most 
important contribution of the Mekhitharists was the vernacularization of Armenian 
literature, which would become important during the nineteenth century for the spread of 
nationalist ideas among other similarly-minded Armenian intellectuals, clergy and 
                                                 
130Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary, 33. 
131Kevork B. Bardakjian, A Reference Guide to Modern Armenian Literature, 1500-1920 (Detroit: Wayne 
State University, 2000), 77. 
 
45 
educated upper classes.132 
Nationalism is inherently a contestation of power relations. In the Armenian case, 
as noted before, imperial powers played an important role by supporting the Armenian 
revolutionary activity in the Ottoman Empire, using them as leverage against Istanbul. 
Throughout the conflicts over the so-called Eastern Question, religion was used as 
a cover for power politics. Russia, France, and Great Britain pursued their policies 
on the basis of claims to the right of protection over the Orthodox, Catholic, and 
Protestant communities of the Ottoman Empire.133 
Berkes’s statement is noteworthy in terms of showing the power of religion in 
politics as well as the importance of politics in religious interactions. The example of an 
Armenian cleric from the Diaspora, Jacques Chahan de Cirbied, is quite telling in terms 
of clerical involvement in international politics. In 1800, he wrote a letter to Catholicos 
Ghukas of Echmiadzin, suggesting that Armenians should make political contact with 
France regarding independence.134 For Nalbandian, Cirbied’s ideas, with notions of 
national self-rule, were an exemplifier of “the influence of European thoughts and history 
on the Armenians in the Diaspora” and of Diasporan Armenians’s support for “the people 
in the ancestral home and their determination to continue the struggle for the liberation of 
Armenia.”135 
Another religious figure of the early eighteenth century, Khatchatur Abovian, also 
contributed to the awakening of the Armenian nation. He completed his education at the 
Monastery of Echmiadzin and then at the Nersessian Seminary in Tiflis.136 In 1830, he 
went to Europe and studied philosophy and history, and also familiarized himself with 
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European languages. After completing his studies, he returned to Echmiadzin with his 
European-influenced thoughts. His writings, which were written in the vernacular, 
reached large audiences, and have thus made him the father of modern Armenian 
literature.137 His significant contributions to Armenian literature included his translations 
from Homer, Schiller, Rousseau, Goethe, Karamzin, Zhukovsky and Krylov;138 these 
efforts should not be seen as mere translations but rather as channels of transmission of 
European socio-economic and political ideas into the Armenian community. Having been 
influenced by the European example, he called for a national awaking among the 
Armenians of Russia with particular emphasis on Armenian patriotism. These thoughts 
also found sympathetic audiences among the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire after the 
1850s. 
The entrance of such European notions coincided with the timeframe when the 
Armenians of the Ottoman Empire faced religious division among themselves as a result 
of missionary activities. In 1831 and 1850, first the Catholic and then the Protestant 
Armenian millets were recognized as separate communities. These official recognitions 
by the Ottoman state were historically significant in that it showed how Istanbul was 
quite comfortable in accommodating new communities with different representations, as 
well as the collapse of the religious and national Armenian unity. This collapse led to the 
emergence of internal conflicts between the Armenian Patriarchate and the converted 
Armenians. 
On a more socio-economic level, another internal problem existed in the 
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Armenian millet itself, namely between the Amira and Esnaf classes. Before focusing on 
the tension between these two classes, I shall give the socio-economic situation of the 
Armenian millet within the Empire. The Armenian millet, as other non-Muslim millets, 
had to pay harac (land tax) and cizye (the head tax) for exemption from military service 
and to pay for the miscellaneous services rendered to them by the Ottoman government. 
The merchant class was also responsible for paying income tax. 
The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire primarily engaged in trade. The Amira 
class, which had technical skills among the traders, played a significant role in finance 
and industry.139 They were the majority of Sarrafs, “bankers or moneylenders,” who were 
controlling the finance and economic affairs of the Empire.140 Another subclass of the 
Amira was the merchants, called Bazirgan in Ottoman, who provided munitions for the 
army, and held the trade routes or controlled a certain trade.141 According to Barsoumian, 
the economic power of the Amira class allowed them to have good relations with the 
governors.142 They also had important networks from the Mediterranean and Eastern 
trades.143 Furthermore, they became the “middlemen” between Ottoman officials and 
Western traders.144 Mantran stresses that their hegemony in trade continued until the 
nineteenth century.145 
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Barsoumian attributes a more important role to the Amira class in the Armenian 
millet since they had the power to control the patriarchate. Amiras contributed to the 
educational and cultural spheres of the Armenian millets by establishing schools and 
churches, supporting religious institutions, creating hospitals and publishing 
magazines.146 The Amira class also played a critical role in the state, mediating between 
the state and the Armenian millet by “controlling both its [Ottoman State’s] financial-
economic system and the Armenian millet.”147 
Within the Armenian millet, another economic group was the Esnaf (artisans) 
class, which settled in metropolises of the Empire. Consisting of Muslims and non-
Muslim millets, the Armenian Esnaf class was a collection of registered guilds depending 
on their occupation. The Esnaf class paid income tax to the state and donated to local 
churches and the patriarchate.148 Their donations for the churches and the patriarchate 
allowed them to assert their authority over the Armenian millet after the Amira class lost 
its economic power.149 
The Amira and Esnaf classes fought for control over the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. The Amiras, who had close relations with the Ottoman government, 
traditionally controlled the Patriarchate of Istanbul. The Esnaf class wanted a share in this 
power, and claimed that the Armenians were not represented properly. Finally, an 
assembly consisting of sixteen Amira and fourteen Esnaf members was established by 
Patriarch Tchukhadjian (1844-1848).150 Ironically, the actions taken by the Patriarchate, 
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independent of the assembly, brought the two classes together against the Patriarch.151 
Thus, in an attempt to solve the problem, a secular structure, consisting of two elected 
assemblies, was established. According to the new order, the Spiritual Assembly would 
rule over religious affairs, and the Supreme Assembly became responsible for secular 
affairs.152 This secular structure, however, could not solve the problems. In 1848, 
Armenians of Istanbul rose against the Amira-controlled Patriarch. For Nalbandian, the 
demonstration of the masses was important in terms of showing their demands for 
“democracy” and “political freedom.”153 
Turning back to a socio-political level, the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms 
attempted to create a more comprehensive identity, Osmanlı (Ottoman citizenship), at 
least partly in order to prevent the break-up of the Empire into subnations. The 
citizenship brought equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims in administrative, judicial, 
economic and educational spheres. Thus, as a result of the close ties with the Ottoman 
government, Armenians began to hold official positions within public services.154 Their 
positions would facilitate the emergence of a national constitution. Following the return 
of Armenian students from Europe, where they had been exposed to the principles of the 
French Revolution, the notions of democracy and nationalism surfaced in the community 
and spread quickly among the Armenians. In turn, these ideas were translated into reality 
with the establishment of the Armenian National Constitution in 1863, which secured 
privileges for the Armenian millet.  
As discussed earlier, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was a turning point in 




154Uzun, “Osmanlı Devleti,” 197. 
 
50 
the emergence of the Armenian question. In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin was signed and 
the Armenian question entered the international scene for the first time. Article 61 
required the Ottoman Empire to initiate reforms in Eastern Anatolia, which had the 
highest concentration of Armenians. In order to represent the Armenians of the Ottoman 
Empire, an Armenian delegation attended the Conference of Berlin. Mkrdich Khrimian, a 
bishop and, later, the Patriarch and the Catholicos, led the Armenian delegation in 
advocating their rights. Khrimian was obviously not a random choice, and his life story 
represented a larger picture that was central to the construction of Armenian nationalism. 
 
A Case Study: the Example of Mkrdich Khrimian 
The formation of Armenian nationalism and the decline of the Ottoman Empire, 
arguably without any causality, overlapped in the Congress of Berlin. Khrimian, the head 
of the Armenian delegation at the Congress, saw the nationalist demands of the Balkan 
communities and told his people the necessity of carrying out a similar program of 
national independence.∗ He focused his efforts on the common people rather than the 
Armenian elite. Khrimian had previously sought to realize the project of 
vernacularization by publishing the first newspaper in Armenian, directed at the Turkish 
Armenian audience in Van. Similarly, his books, sermons and poems also helped forge 
Armenian nationalistic ideals. For Lynch, Khrimian was such an important nationalist 
figure that he declares that “with him religion and patriotism are [became] almost 
interchangeable terms.”155Khirmian’s life story is a history of formative experiences that 
shed further light on how this Armenian Patriarch came to lead a nationalist movement. 
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Born in 1820 in Van, he lost his father when he was young, and later suffered the 
deaths of his wife and daughter; these tragic moments caused acute change in his life. He 
received his initial education from his uncle after his father had died. In 1841, he set out 
to the provinces of Ararat and Echmiadzin. His first book, Hravirag Araratian (Invitation 
to Ararat), which was published in 1850 as a long poem, consisted of his observations 
from this journey.156 Following his travels, he came to Istanbul and occupied himself by 
teaching in several schools. As a result, he built a reputation among Armenians as the 
“Vanetsi varzhapet” (the teacher from Van).157 The journeys of Khrimian continued, with 
travels to Jerusalem and Cilicia until 1854. He published another book, titled Hravirag 
Yergreen Avediatz (Invitation to the Holy City), in which he narrated his journey to 
Jerusalem in 1852.158 When he returned to Van, he received holy orders and became a 
vardapet (archimandrite) in 1855.159 Thus, he joined the Church and had more 
opportunities to serve his people, but now as a pontiff160 using “his natural eloquence.”161 
By aiming to reach the masses, Khrimian founded an Armenian journal, Artsvi 
Vaspurakan (The Eagle of Van), in 1855 after his return to Istanbul.162 Then, he moved 
back to Van and reestablished the journal “as the first periodical printed” in Van from 
1858 to 1863.163 In 1862, when he was assigned to Mush as an abbot, he began 
publishing a new journal called Artsvik Tarono (Little Eagle of Taron), which was 
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published from 1863 to 1865.164 He also established a theology school, Zharanavarots, in 
the Monastery of Varag.165 The focus of the school was to provide students with a 
modern education by emphasizing language, folklore and literature.166 The school 
graduated many students who later led the Armenian revolutionary movements.167 A 
similar school was also founded in Mush by Khrimian during his duty. Because of his 
services to the Armenians of Mush and the abolishment of taxes over the Armenians as a 
result of his endeavors, he was affectionately called Hairig (little father), and this 
nickname became well-known among Armenians.168 
In 1869, Khrimian became the Patriarch of Constantinople, the official 
representative of the Orthodox Ottoman Armenians in the eyes of the Porte.169 Lynch 
states that since his popularity threatened the Ottoman government, his resignation was 
expected after his four-year term in 1873.170 Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878, he was elected by Nerses, the new Patriarchate of Constantinople, as the 
spokesman for the delegation representing the Armenians at the Berlin Congress of 
1878.171 After witnessing the independence struggles of the Balkan communities at the 
Congress, he called for the armament of the Ottoman Armenians in order to fight for an 
independent Armenia. His sermon, called the Paper Ladle, was a declaration of a national 
struggle with a final goal of establishing an Armenian state.  
Returning from Berlin, Khrimian arrived at Van and served as bishop there 
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between 1879 and 1885.172 In the following years, he preached in some districts of 
Istanbul173 until he was elected the Catholicos, the religious leader of all Armenians at 
Echmiadzin, in 1893, where he remained until his death in 1907. During his Catholicate, 
he attempted to direct some political efforts in favor of Armenians within the Ottoman 
Empire and Czarist Russia.174 After this brief encyclopedic summary of Khrimian’s 
biography, I now return to a more analytic and thematic examination of Khrimian. 
Khrimian was not only a religious man but also a traveler, thinker, journalist, 
teacher and activist. Since “Armenian patriotism and the Armenian Church have always 
been identified,”175 his religious personality allowed his popularity to spread among 
Armenians. However, his writings, travels, ideas and activities helped him gain the love 
of the Armenian people, especially the laity. The strong ties between the Hairig and the 
Armenians were forged as a result of his particular emphasis on using the vernacular 
language in his writings and his pro-Armenian political activities. Khrimian’s journeys to 
Echmiadzin, Ararat, and, later, Jerusalem and Cilicia strengthened his patriotic and 
religious feelings due to the religious significance of these places within Armenian 
Gregorian Orthodoxy. During his travels, Khrimian closely observed the state of the 
Armenians who inhabited these regions. Their pains inspired his patriotic feelings, and 
even though Khrimian’s own native land was Van, he spent most of his life elsewhere, 
including Mush, Jerusalem, Cilicia and Istanbul for the purpose of serving his people. 
On first coming to Istanbul, he began to teach in a girls’ school, and later in other 
schools of the various districts of Istanbul. For Khrimian at that time, the education of 
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girls was as important as the education of boys. He established two schools, first in Van 
and, later, in Mush. The curriculum was based on Europe’s modern education system; 
however, the content of teaching focused on nationalistic and patriotic figures. For 
instance, Khrimian had his cousin, Khoren Khrimian, prepare three volumes of 
Armenology.176 Another important function of these schools was to graduate students 
who would later be the prominent members of the Armenian revolutionary movements.177 
In addition to his educational activities, Khrimian always advocated the 
awareness of laymen with nationalistic and patriotic ideas, which was possible only 
through the medium of journals and literature. Defending the importance of the use of 
vernacular language, Khrimian established journals in the vernacular such as Artsvi 
Vaspurakan, The Eagle of Van, (1855-1863) and Artsvik Tarono, The Little Eagle of 
Taron, (1963-1868). The primary goal of both of these journals was to utilize the 
vernacular language in order to awaken the national and patriotic consciousness of the 
peasantry. In addition to this ambitious objective, the journals carried out a mission to 
acquaint the Patriarchate of Constantinople with the conditions of the Armenians of 
Eastern Anatolia.178 Minassian states that the activities of Khrimian during his religious 
service made Varag, a district of Van, “the cradle of the national movement and one of 
the symbols of the Armenian cultural rebirth.”179 
In Khrimian’s literary works, it is possible to see the similar nationalistic and 
patriotic themes and notions that were embellished by religious narratives. Khrimian’s 
first two books, Hravirag Araratian (Invitation to Ararat) and Hravirag Yergreen 
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Avediatz (Invitation to the Holy City), consisted of long poems, and were based on his 
journeys to Ararat and Jerusalem. In these books, Khrimian depicts the beauty of the 
lands and places that serve as the backdrop for the painful lives of the Armenians, within 
the framework of creating a free Armenia. One significant feature of these books was that 
it asked all Armenians living in diaspora to return to the Armenian “homeland.” Another 
book of Khrimian was Papik ev Tornik (Grandpa and Grandson), written in 1894.180 
Peroomian calls the book a “romanticized portrayal of the Armenian village and 
peasant.”181 Again, similar themes of Armenian dispersion and suffering are placed 
within the larger notions of patriotism. Khrimian’s poems were significant instruments 
for the dissemination of patriotic ideals in that they were easily memorized and 
circulated. In this sense, the combination of religious and nationalistic themes was 
poetized by Khrimian. At times, these poems advocated the means of violence in order to 
reach the larger goal of creating an independent Armenia. As Atamian holds, Khrimian 
believed that “there could be no hope for his people except by force.”182 An example 
from his poems, the verses from The Memorial of the Lamenting Soldier, provides an 
idea of his desire for freedom:  
Ye living soldiers, fare ye well! 
I leave this world. I bore 
The sword, and perished by the sword, 
As Christ foretold of yore. 
Angel of love incarnated! 
You said all men that live 
Are brethren; give us your peace, 
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Which this world cannot give!183 
Clearly, this poem combines the recurring themes of religious salvation, suffering, 
other-worldliness and bravery. 
His poetic skills and his natural eloquence were also reflected in his sermons. One 
important aspect of his sermons was his association of nationalistic figures with religious 
ones. His most famous sermon was “The Paper Ladle,” which was given after his return 
from the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In this sermon, he used an analogy of a ladle and 
dish with the sword and freedom in explaining the Balkan countries’ struggle for freedom 
during the Congress. For him, the freedom of Armenia was only possible through the use 
of armed force. In short, Khrimian’s popularity among the Armenians, combined with his 
rhetorical skills in sermons and the strength of his literary works like poems, helped him 
disseminate his nationalist and religious ideas among his compatriots. Now, let me turn to 
the next section where I discuss a more theoretical perspective, i.e., the issue of whether 
or not these nationalist and religious notions put forward by Khrimian form an ethnic or 
religious nationalism. 
 
Armenian Nationalism: Religious Nationalism or Ethnic Nationalism? 
There are three major factors that lead the Church to participate actively in the 
emergence of Armenian nationalism: religion, the dual structure of the Church, and 
subnational identity that was perpetuated for hundreds of years. To clarify, I shall further 
explore these factors. Armenians consider themselves as the first Christian community 
and base their understanding of Christianity on the practices of the apostles. By 
emphasizing such ancestral origins, they strengthened their understanding of their own 




identity as religiously superior to other Christian communities and nations. The second 
factor is the dual structure of the Church. Similar to that of Jewish history, the 
perpetuation of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Armenian history created a 
tradition of coexistence between both religious and political affairs. At the same time, the 
millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which divided the subjects along the lines of 
religious affiliation, allowed the Church to keep its ecclesiastical and political authority 
over the Armenian people. The third element is the fact that as a community the 
Armenians had lived under the yoke of foreign powers since the early fourteenth century. 
As subjugated communities under foreign rule for such a long time, the Church naturally 
became the center for a nationalist movement unified under a religious discourse.  
In considering these factors, I argue that Armenian nationalism derived from 
ethnicity, religion and territory. In other words, Armenian nationalism is an ideology that 
sits on the discursive markers of Armenian ethno-religious identity. Central to these 
discourses was the specific notion of a historic homeland, which was processed with 
ideas of freedom and independence, and decorated with historical tragedies such as 
massacres, forced displacements and a corresponding emergence of Diaspora 
communities. In the emergence of this secular ideology, the Church used these 
characteristics of Armenian nationalism to address the sentiments that appealed to the 
masses and highlight certain political goals deemed to be appropriate for a given 
historical context. Thus, claims of secular, ethnic or religious bases of Armenian 
nationalism depend on who is making the claim. What is clear, however, is that all of 





In Armenian history, “Armenian awakening,” the leading concept of Armenian 
nationalism, dominated the historical accounts after the loss of independent Armenian 
rule in the fourteenth century. The emphases on Christianity, territory and history were 
the key elements of the process of the national awakening. The inspirational ideals of the 
French Revolution of 1789 formed the backbone of the discourses of Armenian 
nationalism, as was commonly the case elsewhere. This study has argued that the role of 
the Church in the emergence of Armenian nationalism in the nineteenth century cannot 
be ignored. The corresponding success of Armenian nationalism is thus inherently related 
to the populist approach of the Church. 
Khrimian was a prominent figure in the formation of the Armenian nationalism. 
He was a pontiff, an intellectual, a leader, but also a peasant. All these features together 
made him Hairig of the Armenians. Atamian, for instance, claims that “[n]o man, 
perhaps, in Armenian history, has come to symbolize the kind, wise, paternalistic leader 
of his flock as did Khrimian who was given the title Hairig (little father) in affection by 
his people.”184 Historically, his most important role was his position as the Catholicos of 
all Armenians, since the Armenian Catholicate took its power from the people and God. 
Thus, the Armenian patriarchate always ran a dual duty in terms of religious and national 
administration. This duality is the key element in understanding the role of the Church in 
the construction of Armenian nationalism. According to Chakmakjian, 
[t]he Christological isolation of the Armenian Church contributed greatly to its 
distinctly national character. Inevitably, the national spirit developed into 
nationalistic and political aspirations. These came into fierce conflict with the 
                                                 




                                                
ruling Muslim state, namely, the Ottoman Empire, and the outcome was 
tragedy.185 
At the heart of the conflict between the Empire and the Armenian nationalists was 
territory. For the former, Eastern Anatolia was not to be lost in accordance with imperial 
ambitions. For the Armenian nationalists, however, the land was their traditional home 
usurped by foreigners for centuries. The conflict that ensued was a violent struggle 
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION 
The previous two chapters have examined the formation of nationalism and how it 
relates to religion with case-study foci on Turkish and Armenian nationalisms. Here, I 
will examine the politicization of religion by nationalistic discourses and its possible 
results of the way people constructed their identities. Scholars working on the Armenian 
question have typically overlooked or ignored the religious dimension of the conflict. 
This research, instead of developing a new theory or approach to the interaction of 
religion and nationalism, aims at filling this scholastic gap. So, I will examine the 
research outcomes of the examination of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms from the 
perspective of religions and then will place the role of religions in the development of 
nationalism by demonstrating specific examples that explain the link. I believe that this 
analysis will open a gate to an understanding of the core reasons of the conflict. 
Thus, this research primarily argues that the politicization of religion through 
nationalistic arguments creates a strong motivation among the common people, which 
can result in violence. In other words, the inquiry that seeks an answer to in what 
conditions and how nationalism makes sense for common people, especially for the 
peasants in the case of the Armenian question, can be explained by putting stress on the 
role of religion as a motivating factor. In order to answer this question, I have examined 
the role of religion in the formation process of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms. By 
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doing so, my goal is to establish a framework for the place of religion in these two 
societies. 
Chapter I argues that Islam in the Ottoman case was a dominant identity-marker 
rather than ethnicity that informs the nation. Turkish nationalism remained an elite 
movement until the Republican era, and the common people continued to identify 
themselves first and foremost as Muslim. In this environment, Islam kept its dominance 
and its power of motivating people in rural areas regardless of ethnicity. The language 
derived from Islamic literature such as vatan, cihad, şehit, and gazi, and the discourses 
inherited from Turkish culture, such as ocak and devlet baba played a significant role in 
the defense of the lands of both individual and vatan. These two aspects are concluded 
with two Islamic explanations: “Ulu’l emre itaat” (Obedience to the authority)186 and 
“Vatan sevgisi imandandır” (Love of homeland is a part of faith). 
Chapter II deals with the relation between the Armenian Church and nationalism. 
It is necessary here to underline once again that the examination of Armenian nationalism 
is limited to the Ottoman Armenians in general and the Armenians living in the Eastern 
Ottoman provinces in particular. The separation of the Armenian and Greek churches in 
the fourth century as well as the territorial map compressed by Byzantium, Persian, and 
later Turkish states created an image of “self-isolation” among the Armenians. This 
image was transformed into a kind of unique identity for Armenians since the Armenian 
Church administered only to the Armenian people or, in contrast, only to the Armenian 
people affiliated with the Church. Thus, many scholars of Armenian history call “national 
Church” one of the Armenian Church’s defining characteristic. This religio-nationalist 
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movement was delivered mostly by the religious figures that put emphasis on the 
revolutionary activities including but not limited to violence. The analysis of the 
formation of the two nationalisms will be discussed in the framework of the leading 
factors of their emergence, characteristics, and conclusion. 
 
The Causes of the Emergence of Turkish 
and Armenian Nationalisms 
The timeline of Turkish nationalism, as discussed earlier, goes back to notions of 
Ottomanism. Ottomanism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century in order 
to absorb the influence of nationalism over the non-Muslim communities by promising 
equal rights regardless of religion and race. The loss of regions mostly populated by 
Christians (Rumelia, i.e., today’s Balkans) caused Abdulhamid II to change the policy to 
Islamism in order to avoid the dissolution of Muslim people composed of diverse 
ethnicities. In spite of the fact that Islamism was a true policy since the reign of 
Abdulhamid II, Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, and other Muslim elements consisted of 
Muslim millet as the majority and settled within all parts of the Empire; its discriminatory 
feature and absolutism caused the non-Muslim elements, who already gained national 
consciousness, to revolt against the administration. In 1908, the CUP captured the 
administration by objecting to Abdulhamid’s absolutism and constructed the Second 
Meşrutiyet (Constitutionalism). However, the CUP government did not perform 
nationalistic policy; in fact, they could not venture to lose non-Turkish Muslim elements 
by emphasizing national discourses. Thus, the emergence of actual Turkish nationalism 
was to be in the early republican era.  
In the case of Armenian nationalism, it is difficult to draw a clear-cut timeline for 
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the emergence of Armenian nationalism. This difficulty is rooted in the literature of 
Armenian historiography. While nationalism is a modern concept in a specific socio-
political context, there is a very strong emphasis in Armenian historiography on national 
awakening as embodied within the Armenian Church since its separation from the Greek 
Church. However, an actual national awakening is first traced in the beginning of the 
eighteenth century with the establishment of the Mekhitharist Congregation in 1701. The 
focus on Armenian history and literature, and the translation of Western classical works 
into the Armenian vernacular, can be counted as the first flare of the Armenian national 
awakening process. The tolerant atmosphere created by the Tanzimat and Islahat reforms 
established grounds for the emergence of more liberal demands from non-Muslim 
communities, including the Armenians. Thus, the forerunners of Armenian nationalism in 
the Ottoman Empire were to be the Western educated students who returned to Istanbul 
in the second half of the nineteenth century in which the Armenian National Constitution 
was accepted (1860) and the revolts were seen in Anatolia (Zeitun 1862, Van, 1862, 
Erzurum, 1863; and Mush, 1864). With the provocation of the students, the Amira class 
lost its power over the Church, and the Church came to be involved in matters of 
nationalism. The message of involvement was delivered to the common people by 
religious figures. Here, too, is seen the politicization of religion with nationalistic 
discourses as Abdulhamid’s Islamism later would do. The politicization of the Armenian 
Church would encourage revolutionary activities for its people.  
As I will mention later, the process of the politicization of the Armenian Church 
was a result of its power struggle with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), 
known well as Dashnaks, over the common people. While the ARF organized uprisings 
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in the Ottoman provinces starting in the 1860s, the Church saw the ARF as a threat to its 
population. ARF, established in Tiflis and influenced by socialism, saw socialist ideology 
as a solution for not only Armenians but also the peasantry of the Ottoman Empire in the 
eastern region.  
The Armenian Church’s role in the distribution of nationalism, the influence and 
contribution of the Diaspora to Armenian literature, history, and thus to national 
awakening, the implications of the Hamidian Cavalry in the Eastern region, the 
manipulative activities of competing powers, namely Britain, France, and Russia, in the 
eastern region of the Empire, and the Armenian revolutionary movements and its political 
parties led Armenian nationalism to complete its formation in the late nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
The Characteristics of Turkish and Armenian Nationalisms 
It would not be wrong to say that the Turkish nationalism was shaped as an 
immediate reaction to new events. As a result of the multiethnic structure of the Empire, 
Ottomanism and Islamism grew to be more inclusive. However, Armenian nationalism 
appeared with the promise of freedom, thus it was aggressive. Being a subnation under 
the rule of a Muslim state facilitated the motivation of people toward an independent 
Armenia. For centuries, Armenians experienced the phenomena of being “self-isolated,” 
starting with their separation from the Greek Church and continuing to be under the 
sovereignty of different reigns. As a unique church that corresponds to a specific territory 
and people, bound by ethnicity, culture, blood, race, and/or history, the Armenian Church 
and Armenian nationalism have always been identified together. 
Since the delivery of nationalism was conducted by the Armenian Church and its 
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local religious leaders, nationalism gained acceptance among the common people. By 
wielding economic reasons and using religious language, the religious leaders 
aggressively provoked the peasants to act against the Ottoman central and local 
authorities. Because of a lack of state, the success of Armenian nationalism required that 
the common people engage in a mass movement. 
Contrary to Armenian self-isolation, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed being a super 
power for centuries. Having the ease of being a super power allowed the Empire to 
conduct tolerant policies for its millets. By the nineteenth century, due to the irresistible 
influence of nationalism, the Empire attempted to protect its social and territorial 
integrity. Thus, Ottomanism was for all millets, Islamism for Muslims, and Turkish 
nationalism for Turks, and, potentially, Turkifiable subjects such as Circassians, 
Albanians, Bosnians, and so on. So, the coverage of Turkish nationalism must have been 
more comprehensive and been based not on ethnicity but on a social common ground— 
religion, namely Islam. 
In the face of the growing influence of the West and the dissolution of nations, 
Turkish nationalism was formed in a nostalgic way aiming to reach the height of its 
former power, success, and glorious history. Thus, attempts to reinterpret Islam according 
to the needs of the modern age are the indicators of the importance of Islam in both social 
and political spheres. In order to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and nationalism, 
Gökalp’s use of the Qur’an to justify his nationalism and his references to modernist-
Islamists such as Afghani are clear examples of these attempts. 
In my opinion, there are two reasons why Turkish nationalism remained an elite 
movement: the multiethnic formation of the Empire, and the limited access to and of the 
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public. The first reason was already discussed in previous chapters. Regarding the second 
reason, access has two dimensions: from public to elite and from elite to public. Since 
intellectual circles were located mainly in Istanbul, the students who went to Europe for 
education came back to Istanbul, not to their native towns, in order to assume a place in 
this circle. Thus, some educated, common people were becoming members of the elite. 
This was the first dimension. The second dimension was the locality. The ‘ulama and 
sheikhs in rural regions were members in their local circle. The strong influence of Islam 
on these local elites obstructed nationalism to find acceptance among commoners. So, 
nationalism, as an ideology that threatened status and authority, the local elite never 
welcomed such an ideology.  
From all these analyses and outcomes, it is possible to draw a general definition 
for both nationalisms. Armenian nationalism was an ethno-religious nationalism since the 
Armenian Church and its people were identified by an ethnicity. It is ironically, the 
Church had always been the official representative of the Armenians in the eyes of the 
Ottoman sultans. Armenian nationalism succeeded in being a mass movement through 
the delivery of religious channels. It was aggressive for two reasons. First, the Church 
and its local representatives fed nationalism with religious discourses, figures, and ideals. 
Second, the contemporary super powers used the Armenians as a tool for the sake of their 
demands on the eastern region by putting emphasis on the rights of the Christian minority 
and playing the role of their protector. The final characteristic of Armenian nationalism 
was to be romantic, which was, again, narrated and idealized by the Church in the 
framework of having a free Armenia. 
On the other side, Turkish nationalism completed its formation relatively late, 
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after the Republic as a top-down ideology. However, it was Islam that dominated the 
social ties and political developments in the multiethnic environment of the Empire. 
Thus, Turkish nationalism was based on cultural-religious identities rather than ethnicity; 
and thus it was inclusive, not aggressive, like Armenian nationalism. It circulated among 
the elite, especially in Istanbul, but never turned to a mass movement. Until the 
republican era, the local elite, consisting of ‘ulama and sheikhs, held an authority over the 
common people. Thus, Islam kept its dominance among the people. On one hand, while 
the politicization of Islam by Abdulhamid II held the Muslims together, on the other hand 
it caused the non-Muslim elements to revolt due to its exclusionary policies. 
In the example of the Armenian question, in addition to social, political, and 
economic dimensions, the religious characteristic should be taken into account in order to 
understand how people are mobilized and for what reason. Nationalism, of course, in the 
socio-political context, created incredible influence over the people by touching and 
scratching their ancestral attachments and praising their own “self” superiority against the 
“others.” However, religions have been in peoples’ lives before nationalism, and people 
have killed and died for their beliefs. So, nationalisms ignited the desire to kill by using 
religions to motivate people. The reactions of the Ottoman people, which consisted of 
Turks, Kurds, or Circassians, were not based on their ethnicity or nation; it was Islam that 
motivated these diverse ethnic people against Armenians as well as “others”. It was the 
Armenian Church that stimulated the masses for a free Armenia, which had been 
promised and thus perceived as an independent Armenia. 
In order to clarify, the Ottoman people and Armenians within the Empire had long 
lived in the same territory, shared the same neighborhood, and enjoyed their own 
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religions as their own ethnic or national identities for centuries until the emergence of 
nationalism. Nationalism not only created new identities but also transformed 
spiritual/divine aspects into secular characteristics. As it transformed religious 
communities into national communities, it converted religions to nationalized versions of 
religions. However, this transformation was not a one-way direction. As much as 
nationalism changed the religious perception of society into nationalistic discourse, 
religion also shaped the characteristics of nationalism. 
My argument at this point is that Turkish and Armenian nationalisms mainly 
differ in their conclusions. While both cases experienced the politicization of religion 
during almost the same periods, exactly after the second half of the nineteenth century, 
there is an important distinction to be made. As discussed above, the formation of 
Turkish nationalism was late in regards to Armenian nationalism. The reason for these 
different formation processes was the social structure of the Ottoman Empire and 
Armenians. By completing its formation, Armenian nationalism declared its ethnic-based 
identity that was combined with religion for centuries. On the other hand, Turkish 
nationalism was experiencing an Islamic phase, which was based on religious identity 
and particularly abstained from emphasizing ethnic identities. 
Once analyzing the formation process of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms, 
what do the outcomes of the process indicate? First, the examination of these two 
nationalisms demonstrates that both nationalisms are constructed on and with a religious 
basis. By taking this argument to the center, this main argument, I will discuss that 
“religiously constituted nationalism increases the propensity for violence in a given 
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polity.”187 I borrow this argument from a paper which deals with “the late nineteenth 
century Kulturkampf between Protestant and Catholic Germans,” and “the Yugoslav 
wars” in terms of religious conflict. In his paper, Acuff examines “the role of religion in 
nationalist violence” by first admitting “national collective identity is constructed through 
a complex mixture of ideas, many of which arise from the prior religious identities of a 
people.”188 
As Durkheim notes, religion is the essential institution that spiritually and socially 
connects individuals to society and creates a conscious of collectivity.189 As the 
examination of Turkish nationalism has showed, the ethnically diverse Muslim people of 
the Ottoman Empire in eastern Anatolia identified themselves with their religious identity 
rather than their ethnicity. Similarly, for the Armenian peasants who lived in the same 
territory, there was no discrepancy between their ethnic and religious identity, which 
means that Armenian national identity aligned with the religious identity. The role of the 
Armenian Church in the distribution of nationalism facilitated Armenian peasants in 
engaging with nationalism. So, what we have here is that, while the Ottoman people still 
did not give priority to national identity and continued to identify themselves as Muslim, 
the Armenians had already embraced nationalism in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Similar to social identification, while Abdulhamid II pioneered 
Islamism by politicizing the religion, the Armenian Church incorporated nationalism as 
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its political discourse in administration level. In both cases, it is obvious that religion was 
politicized by authorities. However, this politicization differed in the articulation of 
Armenian nationalistic discourses. The explanation of this differentiation can be found in 
the natures of Islam and Christianity.190 According to Adrian Hastings, the nature of 
Christianity is able to shape nations and nationalisms: 
Because of the lack of evident political concern in the New Testament as also 
within the early Christian community, Christianity does not start – as Islam did – 
with any clear political model of its own. As a consequence when Christians came 
to power they were able to go in two very different directions. The one, the 
nation-state; the other, the world empire…. The first state to become Christian 
was Armenia in the late third century and the survival of the Armenian national 
identity from then until now is surely one of the remarkable things in human 
history. The kingship did not survive, what did do so was the Armenian Bible, 
liturgy and related literature.191 
So, the espousing of a secular concept, nationalism, by a divine institution, i.e., 
the Armenian Church, becomes meaningful in Hastings’ words. Furthermore, Hastings 
claims that, unlike Benedict Anderson, the appearance of nationalism in Christianity did 
not depend on diminishing the influence of religion since it “never had a sacred 
language.”192 As he correctly puts, the language of Christianity lost its sacredness after 
leaving Palestine by translating the Bible into the vernaculars, such as “Syriac, Armenian, 
Coptic, Ethiopian and Latin in the early centuries.”193 Contrast to Christianity, the 
language of Islam has always been sacred. Attempts at the vernacularization of prayers in 
the Republican era did not find acceptance from the public. 
Another noteworthy point made by Hastings is the role the clergy played in the 
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nationalization process, a point that matches exactly the case of Khrimian. “It was the 
lower clergy who, living in their parishes throughout Europe, relatively poor, literate, 
educated in cathedral schools…, in regular touch with both the landed and the peasantry, 
fostered a sense of shared local, provincial or national identity.”194 Khrimian, as an 
example of the Armenian case—lived mostly in and around Van, his hometown, received 
education from local churches, came from a poor peasant family—encouraged his people 
to adopt a nationalist ideology. 
Even though the Muslim ‘ulama of the Ottoman Empire lived in a similar 
environment, they were distinguished from Christian clergy in terms of religious 
approaches to nationalism. The more significant difference was the religions’ perception 
of politics, in general, and nationalism, in particular. The Kurdish ‘ulama’s attitude that 
gave priority to religious identity was one the reasons for the late the emergence of ethnic 
nationalist ideas among the Kurdish people. 
Having clarified the relationships of Turkish nationalism with Islam and 
Armenian nationalism with the Gregorian Armenian Church, I shall now turn to how they 
were affiliated with religion and came to encounter one another. 
 
Identification of Ethnicity with Religion 
Armenian identity is based on its “uniqueness” of national representation by a 
national church through its own liturgical language.195 Under the umbrella of Christianity, 
the Armenian Gregorian Church gained a national affiliation with the Armenians. Thus, 
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many scholars of nationalism associate this affiliation with Jewish identity.196 The ethno-
religious Armenian identity in its historical formation does not allow one to make a clear 
analysis in order to separate ethnic and religious attachments of the integrated identity. 
As Claire Mitchell discusses, one needs to take Armenian identity as the result of “a 
dynamic two-way relationship between religious and ethnic identity.” In Armenian 
identity, religion is meant not only as an ethnic marker, but also as a support for ethnicity 
via “its symbols, rituals and organizations,” and fabric of ethnicity by providing 
sacredness, ideological concepts, and institutions for social and political mobilizations.197 
There were two significant reasons for the preservation of Armenian identity. The 
first reason was the millet system of the Empire that categorized its people in terms of 
their religious identity instead of their ethnic identity. Due to the millet system, the 
religious institution (Orthodox Christian, Catholic Christian, Gregorian, Jewish, and later 
Protestant Christian churches) was the legal representative of its members. This religion-
based identification allowed the Gregorian Church, to have authority over its Armenian 
people.  
Secondly, by being a subnation under an imperial power, this position led to the 
creation of an instinct for preservation of the Armenian identity in order to avoid 
assimilation. Again, it was the Church protecting the Armenian identity by 
“autonomisation of the political category with respect to the religious domain.”198 The 
power struggle between the ARF, known as the Dashnak Organization founded in Tiflis 
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in 1890, and the Armenian Church over the mass population consisting of workers, 
peasants, and local traders was another indication of the identification process of the 
Eastern Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. While the Dashnak revolutionists attempted 
to use the religious areas for their meetings in order to preach their socialist messages, the 
Church severely objected to the use of churches and monasteries for the Dashnaks’ 
purposes.199 
The identification of Armenians via religious sentiments was not a modern 
process, but gained considerable acceleration after the emergence of nationalism. The 
clergy saw the potential to lose its authority over its people, since nationalism not only 
triggered rationality but also threatened the divine attachments of people by politicizing 
them. In other words, nationalism as a secular concept may aim to displace, adapt, and/or 
politicize the function of divine religions.200 In three cases, religion remains a major 
element for the domain of nationalism. Thus, the approach of the clergy to nationalism 
would be on the basis of rejection, cooperation/adaption, or contribution. The Armenian 
clergy did not reject nationalism, moreover it cooperated with and contributed to 
nationalism. I will turn later to the issue of the contribution to and cooperation with 
nationalism.  
In the Ottoman case, it was obvious that Islam was an identity-marker for both the 
state and its people. With the exception of the position of the sultanate, all Muslim people 
enjoyed the same rights regardless of their ethnicity in administration, military, and 
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bureaucracy. Due to Islamic law, Sharia, although the Muslim population was “millet-i 
hakime,” i.e., the dominant or superior people who enjoyed socio-political privileges and 
benefits, other non-Muslim religious groups had the opportunity and space to perform 
their religious requirements. Since this religion-based system allowed non-Muslim 
elements to keep their ethnic identities alive, it prevented the emergence of ethnic ideas 
among Muslim populations. Although the Ottoman Empire, as an Islamic state in terms 
of its law, gave priority religious to identity over ethnic or national identity, there was 
always Turkishness in the representation of Islamic religious identity in the eyes of non-
Muslims. So, the Ottoman Empire was called a Turkish state as well as an Islamic state 
because of the great contributions of the Turks to Islam, which found an expression in the 
equality of Turk and Muslim. 
On the social level, for Muslim populations, ethnic identity was not totally wiped 
out but reduced to secondary importance. Religion-based identification, as in the example 
of the Empire, provides a wide-ranging participation, but also a loose one at the same 
time. Religion functioning as an umbrella identification hosts different cultures, 
ethnicities, traditions, e.g., and it aims to transform these attachments into its own 
concepts. In this sense, religion is comprehensive. While religion boasts the numbers of 
its members, the priority of nationalism is one of its qualities. Thus, nationalism is not 
comprehensive but selective; meaning, it limits its characteristics as much as it can. It 
prefers one ethnicity, one religion, one culture, one language rather than two. 
To return to the Ottoman case, when the influence of nationalism began to 
threaten the Empire’s social and political order, the administration came up with the 
ideology of Ottomanism. As a pluralist nationalism, Ottomanism attempted to identify its 
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people based on citizenship regardless of race and religion, and it saw a powerful reaction 
to this from intellectuals. Their reaction was not based on ethnicity but religion, namely 
Islam. They referred to the principle of equality in Sharia, saying that non-Muslims 
cannot have the same rights as Muslims do. Following Ottomanism, Abdulhamid II’s 
Islamism, again, sat on religious principles for identity creation. Even the Young Turk 
movement was not founded as an ethnic-nationalist ideology since the Empire still 
accommodated non-Turk Muslim populations. 
As Ottoman and Armenian cases within the context of the formation process of 
nationalism demonstrate, religion played a major role in the formation of identity. 
Although the relation between ethnicity and religion has a dual characteristic, religion in 
the Ottoman case is dominant. However, in the Armenian case, religion is ethnicized. 
Thus, the social identity of both the Ottoman and Armenian peoples posits that the 
conflict between the Empire and the Armenians has a religious base, too, which cannot be 
ignored. First, putting forth this actuality, I can now examine how this religious base 
caused the mobilization of masses. 
 
Territorial Affiliation of Religion and Nationalism 
A given territory plays a major role in nationalistic discourses. Territory not only 
means belonging to a certain land, but also gains a “sacred” meaning and “becomes place 
of reverence and awe” in the creation of memories. Sacred lands turn into “fatherland” by 
the “sanctification of territory”.201 In this context, the homeland, as Smith states, is sacred 
due to “the presence and activities of saints, prophets and sages.” The representation of 
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the fatherland concept for Armenians finds an explanation in the same way. In Smith’s 
words, “St Gregory’s missions to the various provinces of the kingdom of Armenia 
endowed them with a novel sanctity, binding them together as a union of Christians.”202 
In this sense, Khrimian’s travels to Ararat, Echmiadzin, Jerusalem, Cilicia, and his 
observations of these places, carried a patriotic mission. In so doing, he emphasized the 
importance of places in terms of religious and historical perspectives, and also aimed to 
acquaint between his people with these places. The demonstration of the close relation 
between religion and territory appeared in Khrimian’s personality. Thus, Lynch would 
say for Khiriman that “with him religion and patriotism [became] almost interchangeable 
terms.”203 
In the Ottoman Empire, the lack of ethnic sentiments becomes obvious in the 
sense of territory. Until the nineteenth century, there was no specific term evoking 
religious connotations, such as fatherland. With the influence of the French Revolution in 
the political sphere, the term vatan was first used to mean patrie in the late eighteenth 
century.204 While in classical Arabic watan (vatan in Turkish) means “one’s place of 
birth or residence,” it acquired the meaning of fatherland through the politicization of 
religion in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. The new usage of the word watan 
meant ‘the land conquered and then administrated by Muslims.’ As Lewis notes, “the 
word watan, with derivatives for ‘patriot’ and ‘patriotism,’ passed into common use as 
part of the new nationalist terminology, and a number of older terms, part of the political 
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languages of Islam, began to acquire new meanings.”205 Thus, as much as the holy places 
of Islam are sacred, the lands gained by shedding blood and giving martyr are also 
somehow sacred in the same way. The religious expression vatan in the socio-politic 
arena was based on a Hadith reading as “hubbu’l-watan mine’l-iman” (the love of 
fatherland is a part of faith). In the Ottoman case, the lack of ethnic identification caused 
the politicization of religion in order to motivate people for the sake of sacredness, as 
sanctifying the lands by referring to Islamic sources. 
As a result of the overlap of two different entities in the same territory sanctified 
with their own perceptions, any activities or conflicts based on the land, whether 
originating from economic reasons or not, potentially found religious expressions. The 
existence of religious places and the mythicized belonging to the land deeply influenced 
the collective memories of the people.206 In this context, the relocation process of the 
Ottoman Empire thus meant that Armenians were exiled from their ancestral fatherland in 
which they had their symbolic churches, such as Echmiadzin to Jerusalem. 
Sanctifying a territory requires people to sacrifice themselves for the land in the 
framework of nationalism. As Kathryn McClymond puts, “the seemingly timeless and 
transcendent authority of sacrifice is often used as a tool for creating national identity and 
loyalty.”207 Without excluding or reducing the influence of social and economic reasons 
of the conflict, as I argued, it is necessary to consider how nationalism created its 
characteristics derived from religious language, and how it politicized this religious 
language for the motivation of common people through religious authorities. 
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Mobilization of Masses: Sacrifice Concept and Violence 
Due to the characteristics of both Turkish and Armenian nationalisms, religion 
played a major role in the conflict on the territorial level. The conflict was based on 
several reasons, such as economic and socio-politic ones. However, what made the 
conflict result in tragedy were not the reasons but the common people’s perception of 
these reasons; in other words, how the common people were motivated in order to 
achieve their goals. For the Ottoman people, threat perception was based on their social, 
political, economic, and territorial conditions within their vatan as a result of the national 
independence movements of non-Muslim millets. The struggle of Armenians for their 
independence from the Ottoman Empire by claiming the region as their fatherland was a 
threat directed at the Ottoman people of the region. The goal of Muslim population was 
to keep territorial integrity in order to maintain their presence in the region. 
Conversely, the Armenians perceived a threat from the Ottoman administration 
toward their economic and social positions. While Christian millets were succeeding in 
attaining their independence one after another from the Ottoman Empire, only Armenians 
among the Christian communities in the 1910 onwards and the Jews could not achieve its 
independence. Thus, the goal of the Armenian nationalism was to build an independent, 
ethnic-Armenian nation-state on its ancestral fatherland within the Ottoman Empire.  
At this point, I argue that the integration of nationalist discourses with religious 
language provided strong motivation for peoples’ struggles. Sheikhs and the ‘ulama of 
the Empire, on one hand, and the Armenian clergy, on the other, accelerated peoples’ 
feelings of fighting onaccount of their sacred goals. A religious narrative has the 
potential to motivate people by touching their feelings. This motivation mostly appears in 
 
79 
the form of one sacrificing everything, including one’s life. Ivan Strenski, in his study of 
the concept of sacrifice in France in the nineteenth century, discusses how religious 
notions, especially the concept sacrifice, are used in politics as tools to motivate people to 
kill and die for the country.208 
In the mobilization of the masses, religion easily penetrates the feelings of people 
through social networking. McClymond writes that “[t]he successful use of sacrificial 
language in public discourse infuses certain civil and national activities with religious 
authority.”209 According to McClymond, “multivalent notion of sacrifice, then, can be an 
effective tool for reinforcing and representing national as well as religious identity.”210 In 
Smith’s words,  
it is not sacrifice per se, but a powerful sense of national destiny grounded in 
sacrifice” that “has repeatedly helped to mobilize the citizens for defense of 
homeland, inspired heroic myths of battle and of the noble death of the patriot-
warrior, and has sought permanent expression through the commemoration of 
their actions in art and monumental sculptures that enfold the members of the 
nation and summon them to fulfill that destiny for which their compatriots laid 
down their lives.211 
Khrimian, again, appears in the mobilization of the masses with his writings, 
sermons, speeches, journals, and educational activities that were decorated with 
nationalistic discourses. Voluntarily performing as a teacher in Istanbul, establishing 
theology schools in Van and Mush, and printing journals first in Van and then in Mush 
provided Khrimian with influential communication with the masses. Although the 
schools he established were theology schools, the content of his teachings was centered 
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on nationalistic and patriotic figures. It is worth noting that the students of his theology 
schools became the forerunners of Armenian revolutionary movements.212 Another 
significant contribution of Khrimian in the mobilization of the masses was the three-
volume work of Armenology, which Khrimian had his cousin Khoren Khrimian 
prepare.213 Khrimian, he himself being a son of a peasant family, focused on how to 
mobilize the common people. Thus, his journals utilized vernacular language in order to 
awaken the national and patriotic consciousness of the peasantry. The result of 
Khrimian’s activities led Van to be “the cradle of the national movement and one of the 
symbols of the Armenian cultural rebirth.”214 
In the Ottoman case, it is hard to come across a figure similar to Khrimian. The 
administering of education by local ‘ulama, the religious characteristics of state policies, 
and the social unity of the Ummah principle allowed religious discourses to be carried 
out. Thus, the mobilization of the masses in the Ottoman case was easier than it was in 
the Armenian one. In addition to religious institutions, settled state institutions had the 
advantage of being able to reach people. For instance, the position of Sheikh-ul-Islam 
was a powerful institution among the Muslim population since it issued fetvas; for 
example, the well-known “Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914” called Muslim people 
to fight against infidels all over the world.215 
The mobilization of masses through religious discourses for nationalist demands 
naturally leads to the emergence of violence. Once the emotions of masses are directed at 
achieving their nationalistic goals, concrete reasons trigger the emergence of violence. 
                                                 
212Peroomian, “Heritage of Van,” 139. 
213Ibid. 
214Ter Minaassian, “Van 1915,” 223. 
215Quoted in Karpat, Politicization of Islam, 370. 
 
81 
For example, Christopher Dandeker writes, “[w]hen social and economic disadvantages 
(real or perceived) are linked closely with regional and ethnic divisions and sources 
identity, then violent conflict can ensue…”216 
Returning to the Armenian case, Khrimian’s sermon, the Ladle Paper, calling 
Armenians to be armed after the Berlin Congress, is an appropriate example of the 
emergence of violence. After praising the struggles of other non-Muslim nations for their 
independence, Khrimian spoke to his people: 
…As you know, upon the decision of Patriarch Nersess and the National 
Assembly, we went to Berlin to present the Armenian Case to the great powers of 
the Congress. We had great hopes that the Congress would bring peace to the 
world and liberation to the small and oppressed nations, among which we count 
ourselves. 
…People of Armenia, of course you understand well what the gun could have 
done and can do. And so, dear and blessed Armenians, when you return to the 
Fatherland, to your relatives and friends, take weapons, take weapons and again 
weapons. People, above all, place the hope of your liberation on yourself. Use 
your brain and your fist! Man must work for himself in order to be saved.217 
His speech carries religious motives decorated with nationalistic goals that 
promoted violence. Moreover, as Kedourie argues, politicized religion in the account of 
nationalism creates a legitimacy and justification for the use of violence and terror by 
provoking peoples “atavistic emotions.”218 
As these specific examples demonstrate, the conflict carries religious figures, 
attachments, and discourses than many scholars have ignored or disregarded. Of course, 
to look at the conflict from a religious perspective does not mean that it can be 
understood only in a religious framework or reduced to a religious conflict. The 
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examination of nationalism in Turkish and Armenian cases shows that religion played the 
major role in their formation. The interaction of religion and politicization emerged as a 
new concept that has caused many social and political transformations. Just as I have 
discussed that the politicization of religion facilitated the motivation and mobilization of 
masses, Smith writes, 
[w]hile nationalisms may invoke or ally themselves with particular religious 
traditions, the tension between them often produces a number of transformations 
characteristic of the modern world which contributes to the sense of flux and mass 
instability. Among these mass transformations is the oft-noted politicisation of 
religion, in which traditional motifs are endowed with new political 
significance.219 
To conclude, I believe that, in addition to economic, politic, and social 
dimensions of the conflict, the religious facet of the conflict needs to be studied. While 
religion and nationalism were strongly affiliated with each other in both Ottoman and 
Armenian cases, it is important to consider the religious elements which created social 
transformation and mobilization. Moreover, I argue that nationalism owes its success to 
religion by using it as a tool for reaching people. Nationalism did not preclude the place 
of religion in social life, but 
[r]eligion, far from being squeezed out of the frame of a secularizing modernity, 
re-emerges within it in new guises. Its legacies are not buried and forgotten, rather 
they are transmuted in and by nationalism. For, not only are specific motifs, 
symbols, and traditions of earlier world religions taken over and used by 
nationalists, at the official and popular levels; nationalism itself, through its 
conception of the nation as a sacred communion, with its own doctrines, texts, 
liturgies, ceremonies, churches, and priests becomes a novel kind of 
anthropocentric, intra-historical, and political ‘religion’, a (rival or allied) 
functional equivalent of the old, transhistorical religions, but one that like them 
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fulfils many of the same collective functions through analogous rituals, myths, 
and symbols.220 
Thus, even social and economic reasons can cause the emergence of conflict; their 
origins lay deep within the sacred perceptions of a society. I do not think that when a 
land, either a farmland or fatherland, is taken by force, the reaction of the people will be 
the same. Thus, sanctification and sacrifice create sacredness in social memory. Even 
though nationalism is a modern and a secular concept, it uses religious roots, memories, 
and myths and politicizes them for its own benefits, as was seen in my examination of the 
conflict between Turkish and Armenian nationalisms. As Christopher Dandeker states, 
“…[i]n order to achieve the goals of nationalism—some form of autonomy for the nation, 
if not independence—cultural nationalism has to become conjoined with, or become 
transformed into, political nationalism.”221 Thus, the conflict was not only the result of 
the clash of two nationalisms in the same territory, but also a result of a clash between 
two different religions, cultures, arts, histories, and myths that were politicized through 
nationalist discourses.  
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CONCLUSION 
The examination of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms provides an 
understanding of the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Armenians. In this 
research, I go further and examine the two nationalisms from a religious perspective in 
order to demonstrate the influence of religions in the formation of nationalisms, and its 
particular impact on the events of 1915. Instead of focusing on the results of these events, 
I focus on the reasons for which these events are deeply rooted in an ecclesiastic 
background. The aim of this research is to demonstrate that, in addition to economic, 
social, and political reasons, an approach to these events can be assumed that emphasizes 
religious aspects.  
The first two chapters have examined the formation of nationalism and its relation 
to religion in the cases of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms. Chapter I discusses how 
the relatively delayed emergence of nationalism as a state ideology in the Ottoman 
Empire was based on the multiethnic and multireligious character of the millet system. 
The French Revolution and its aftermath in the Balkans forced the Ottoman 
administration to take measures—Tanzimat and Islahat Fermanları—to avoid the 
dissolution of the Empire. Thus, instead of ethnic or religious identification, the Ottoman 
administration attempted to identify its subjects as Osmanlı (Ottoman) by providing 
citizenship with equal rights irrespective of religion and race. The first attempt to reach 
this end came from the Ottoman bureaucracy which argued that the superiority of being 
Muslim (Millet-i Hakime) was an indispensable motto in terms of Sharia.  
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Following Ottomanism, Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) conducted a religious version 
of identification named Islamism, defending the unity of Muslims not only within but 
also outside of the Empire. This marked the first instance of the politicization of Islam as 
an official discourse. Abdulhamid II aimed to keep non-Turkish Muslims away from the 
influence of nationalism. There was some success if the territorial integrity of the Muslim 
population is considered. However, the Islamist discourse unavoidably brought an 
absolutism that led to the strengthening of national feelings among the non-Muslim 
elements of the Empire, such as those of the Armenians. It was at the reign of 
Abdulhamid II that the Armenian question first reached its peak. Nonetheless, the 
absolutism of Abdulhamid II should be read in the context of the non-Turkish Muslim 
population. It was the reason for which Abdulhamid II did not allow the discussing and 
spreading of Turkish nationalism as an alternative identification that threatened the social 
base of the Muslim population. Yet, there were organizations outside the Empire 
developing the ideology of Turkish nationalism. 
The Young Turk movement, the most well-known nationalist organization, 
overthrew Abdulhamid II and came to power in 1908 as a political party titled İttihat ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress). Although the hierarchy of the 
movement consisted of Turkish nationalist intellectuals and activists, the movement 
hosted Islamists, Ottomanists, and Turanists, and also groups opposing the absolutism of 
the Sultan, such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party, Dashnak. Yusuf 
Akçura and Ziya Gökalp, the ideologues of modern Turkish nationalism, were also in 
touch with the movement. 
However, the end of absolutism resulted in the explosion of Turkish nationalist 
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discourses. The CUP government encountered the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the events of 
1915, and WWI (1914-1918). Thus, the CUP had to be active mostly in the field of war 
rather than intellectual and political spheres. Since Turkish nationalism was not an ethnic 
and systematic discourse, it had to remain an elite movement. This, of course, had other 
social reasons: the migration of the Muslim population from the Balkans and Caucasia 
after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the presence of the multiethnic Muslim 
population in the Eastern region of the Empire, and the failure to deliver nationalistic 
ideas to the common people via elite and local notables, the sheikhs and ‘ulama. 
Here, two reasons are worth mentioning in order to clarify the failed delivery of 
nationalism. First, education was still administered in local circles that centered on 
religious teachings and was conducted by the local ‘ulama. So, there was limited access 
to external local scholarship. Second, students who went to Europe to receive their 
education preferred to stay in Istanbul, the intellectual center of the Empire, rather than 
return to their homes. Therefore, the Sheiks were in control of the authority. The sheikhs 
gained this power with Abdulhamid II’s support in order to avoid the rebellions of the 
Kurdish notables who lost power after the centralization of the Empire. Despite these 
means, there would be a few low-key, local Kurdish rebellions during the reign of 
Abdulhamid II, but the important ones would not appear until after the Republic, namely 
the Şeyh Said (1925), Ağrı (1930), and Dersim (1937-1938) rebellions.  
There were also significant contributions made by the local ‘ulama and sheikhs in 
order to encourage and organize people in the “holy” war against infidels during WWI 
and the War of Independence. As an example, a Kurdish ‘ulama, Said Nursi, was a 
forerunner in this kind of initiative. With Kurdish ethnicity, he never advocated Kurdish 
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nationalism; moreover, he praised the Turkish nation for its glorious services to Islam.222 
According to Said Nursi, an identity should have been constructed through religion rather 
than a nation.223 Being both Kurdish and Muslim, he concentrated on the concept of the 
vatan in a religious way, not in a national or an ethnic one. He educated his students 
according to this principle; moreover, he voluntarily joined the Ottoman army during 
WWI and fought against the Armenians.224 
In this environment, Islam kept its dominance and withheld its power to motivate 
people in rural areas regardless of their ethnicity. The language derived from Islamic 
teachings, such as vatan, cihad, şehit, and gazi, and the language inherited from Turkish 
culture, such as ocak and devlet baba, played a significant role in the defense of the lands 
of both the individual and the vatan. 
On the other hand, the Armenian case yields similar results. The separation of 
Armenian and Greek Churches in the fourth century and the territory compressed by 
Byzantium, Persian, and later Turkish states created a “self-isolation” image among 
Armenians. This image transformed into a kind of identity for Armenians since the 
Armenian Church administered only to the Armenian people or, more specifically, only 
to Armenian people affiliated with the Church. Thus, many scholars of Armenian history 
call “a national Church” one of the defining characteristics of the Church. By establishing 
their roots in the Urartians and labeling the first officially Christian society, Armenians 
praised their land and their religion. This embodied religious territoriality experienced a 
nationalistic phase after the French Revolution via the translations and publications of the 
                                                 





Diaspora. The early phrase of nationalism led to a national awakening. However, the 
return of Armenian students with a Western education activated Armenian nationalism at 
a political level within the Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The Patriarchate of Istanbul was the head of the Armenian millet in terms of their 
religious representation in the eyes of the Ottoman sultans. In social and economic 
contexts, they were allowed to make trade, but, like other non-Muslim millets, they had 
to pay taxes in return for being exempt from military services. The non-Muslim millets 
were also not welcomed to hold positions at administrative levels. However, the 
Armenians had some privileges such as taking place in the bureaucracy and having close 
relations with the administrative class. In these privileges, the role of the Amira class was 
significant. The Amira class, due to its close relations with the sultans, was able to control 
the Patriarchate, too. 
The power of the Amira class over the Patriarchate caused a conflict with the 
other economic class, Esnaf. Interestingly, the return of students from Europe and the 
disturbance of the Esnaf class, with the power of the Amira class, coincided at the same 
time. The students provoked the Armenians of Istanbul by demanding their own 
Nizamname (Armenian National Constitution), which would be accepted in 1860 and 
declared in 1863. This was also one of the turning points in the relations of the Ottomans 
and Armenians, since the Amira class lost its power over the Patriarchate and indirectly 
over the Armenians; thus, the Ottoman administration also lost its control over the 
Armenians. During these same years, Armenian rebellions began to emerge in Anatolia. 
The rebellions of Zeitun (1862), Van (1862), Erzurum (1863), and Mush (1864) were the 
igniters of future rebellions of Armenians against the Empire.  
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Bringing into balance the power of the Patriarchate of Istanbul, the Church’s 
attitude toward nationalism gained acceleration. It was at this moment that the nationalist 
religious leaders appeared in the field as well. An excellent example of this combined 
characteristic was Mkrdich Khrimian, who would later become the Patriarch of Istanbul. 
This religio-nationalist movement was delivered mostly through religious figures by 
putting emphasis on revolutionary activities, including violent ones. In this sense, 
Khiriman’s speech at the Berlin Congress was quite important for showing the 
Armenians’ transformation into a revolutionary method. 
The delivery of this new method by the religious leaders also provided a wide 
distribution of religio-nationalistic ideas among the common Armenians living in rural 
areas. Coming from a rural area himself, Khrimian was able to manipulate the common 
people; he gave priority to education by establishing schools in Armenian-populated 
regions, vernacularized publications, sermons, lectures in schools, and poems. The 
observations he made during his travels to regions that had considerable historical, 
cultural, and religious importance, such as Echmiadzin, Ararat, and later Jerusalem and 
Cilicia, strengthened his patriotic and religious feelings. His election to the Patriarchate 
of Istanbul was the result of his activities among the Armenians. His election also 
indicated that the Amira class and the Empire lost power over the Armenians.  
From an examination of both cases, there are inferences of which some are similar 
and are some not. Religion in both cases is the primary social attachment. The phrases of 
Turkish nationalism indicate that, in the context of social integrity, there was no way to 
create a society without Islam. The objections of the Young Ottomanists to the Tanzimat 
Reforms, the Islamism policy of Abdulhamid II, and debates over the essence of the 
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Turkish nationalism in terms of exclusionary or inclusionary frameworks in the 
consideration of the non-Turkish Muslim elements originated from Islam. So, Islam 
played a significant role at both transitional and formational levels of Turkish 
nationalism. However, its role was not always as a feeder but also as a receiver, which 
means that, as much as Islam contributed to the formation of Turkish nationalism, 
Turkish nationalism transformed Islam into a nationalistic religion as well. However, 
besides this dual interaction, Islam was politicized by the state-authority. The attempts to 
change the nature of religion in terms of its social perception, just as Tanzimat and 
Islahat Fermanları had reduced its role or Abdulhamid II’s Islamism policy excluded 
“others,” created social disorder in a multiethnic empire. While the Tanzimat and Islahat 
Fermanları brought an equal citizenship status to all subjects regardless of religion and 
race, the Young Ottomans worked to ensure that the equality of Muslims and non-
Muslims would not be accepted according to Sharia. On the other hand, Islamism 
conducted exclusionary politics against non-Muslim communities, especially the 
Armenians. These exclusionary politics also allowed the Armenians and the CUP to 
cooperate against Abdulhamid II’s absolutism. 
Following the disposition of Abdulhamid II, the CUP administration was faced 
with the similar problems. The failure to deliver ideas to the common people living in 
rural areas and wars made it such that Islam continued to be the main social boundary 
between the different ethnic-based Muslim people of the Empire. Especially in the 
Eastern region of the Empire, the Kurd- and Circassian-populated provinces, the sheikhs 
and ‘ulama uttered religious discourses in order to hold social integrity. 
Although the members were called “Young Turks,” the movement consisted of 
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groups that had different origins in terms of ideologies and ethnicities. The common point 
among the groups was to oppose the regime; thus, it was a pragmatic organization 
expecting benefits with the deposition of the Sultan. Because of this pragmatic approach 
and the different ethnic origins of its members, the Young Turk movement could not 
present a systematic ideology of Turkish nationalism. 
Turning back to the Armenian case, the conclusion of the power struggle over the 
Patriarchate in favor of nationalist-revolutionist Armenians accelerated revolutionary 
movements within the Empire. The “self-isolated” characteristic of the Armenian Church 
and its people facilitated nationalism in gaining acceptance among them. In addition to 
the increasing number of revolts by Armenians within the Empire, several revolutionary 
organizations were established. The first of these organizations, the Union of Salvation, 
aimed for “self-protection” and was founded in 1872 in Van. This was where Khrimian 
built the first publishing house in 1855.225 Here, it is worth mentioning a declaration 
given by one of the organization’s spokesmen and highlighting one of the organization’s 
letters in order to demonstrate how the nationalistic and religious discourses were 
combined: 
The declaration reads, 
“… [g]one is our honor; our churches have been violated; they have kidnapped 
our brides and our youth; they take away our rights and try to exterminate our 
nation … let us find a way of salvation … if not, we will soon lose everything.” 
And the letter says, 
In order to save ourselves from these evils (Ottomans), we are prepared to follow 
you even if we must shed blood or die. We are ready to go wherever there is 
hope for our salvation. 
If the alternative to our present condition is to become Russified, let us Russified 
                                                 
225Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary, 80. 
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together; if it is to be emigration, let us emigrate; if we are to die, let us die; but 
let us be freed. This is our desire.226 
As these passages demonstrate, there are two points that need further discussion. 
The first point is that the use of religious language (salvation and evil), religious duty 
(shed blood or die), and places (church) are steeped in nationalistic style. Secondly, for 
Armenians who desire freedom, “to become Russified” is more acceptable than becoming 
Ottomanized. By saying this, there is also a religious choice between Islam and 
Christianity. 
Another similar text was produced by Khrimian in the Berlin Congress. In his 
speech, he emulated the independence struggles of Balkan peoples and spoke of the 
necessity of his people to be armed in order to attain an “Independent Armenia”. This 
speech was also emphasized with nationalistic and religious language. 
As the Armenian case indicates, there is a process of politicization of religion 
conducted mostly by religious leaders. The politicization process of the “national” 
Armenian Church started with the influence of nationalism. In other words, the already 
nationalistic Church became active in politics, and it did this by expressing revolutionary 
ideas and encouraging violence, if required. 
An outcome of the examination demonstrates that, while Turkish nationalism 
remained an elite debate in 1910s, Armenian nationalism completed its formation around 
the second half of the nineteenth century and found acceptance from laymen. The delay 
of the development of Turkish nationalism can be explained within the multiethnic 
imperial structure, meaning the Empire still had non-Turkish and non-Muslim subjects 
under its sovereignty; thus, it was not able to shape ethno-national policies. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
226Ibid., 80-81 (Emphases added). 
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these policies were shaped in order to save the day, not to build the future. The Armenian 
case, on the other hand, has uniqueness in terms of the relationship between the 
Armenian Church and its people. Representing a single nation, “the Church identified 
with the national aspirations of its people.”227 
The analysis of the Turkish and Armenian nationalisms also shows that both 
nationalisms engage religious figures, symbols, and language. This engagement in the 
Armenian nationalism is not clear because of the Church’s dual commitment to religious 
and political representation. However, in the Turkish case, Islam kept its priority in 
identification although the word Türk meant ‘Muslim’ in many cases. The final period of 
the Ottoman Empire proved that Islam was still a social tie between various ethnic people 
of the Empire, such as Kurds and Circassians. 
The third and relatively more important outcome of the examination is based on 
the interaction of nationalism and religion. The already existing religious backgrounds in 
both cases were transformed into nationalized political versions. The Armenian Church 
was convenient for this change because of its national characteristic. However, the 
Church’s goading of the people toward revolutionary and armed activities triggered an 
increase in violence. In a parallel way, Abdulhamid II’s Islamism, a political expression 
of religion, concluded with an absolutism that excluded non-Muslim communities. The 
increase in Armenian revolts during the reign of Abdulhamid II should be understood in 
this framework. There was a conflict that emerged at the moment of the politicization 
process of religions with nationalistic expressions. 
In a general, nationalistic understanding, one can basically define the conflict as 
                                                 




the existence of two nationalisms on the same land. This land is considered fatherland 
according to Armenian nationalistic view. The Armenians’ self-attachment to the 
Urartians in their mythicized national history should be understood in compliance with 
this view. The Echmiadzin Church—the symbolic center of the Armenian Church—and 
Mount Ararat were a couple of examples of the demonstration of their territorial 
belonging. In contrast to the Armenian case, the land gains meaning with its feth 
(conquest) by Muslim conquerors and becomes vatan in Islamic perception. During the 
Tanzimat Era, the Young Ottomans emphasized the concept vatan in a patriotic 
expression to strengthen the loyalty of the people to the Empire. Instead of the word yurt, 
the use of vatan also carries a religious meaning which is a combination of Islam and the 
land, literally Islamic land. This concept is expressed in the saying Vatan toprağı 
kutsaldır! (The land of vatan is holy!). 
Religions are suitable for transformation in accordance with the needs of people. 
The expression or interpretation of religions is able to be modified in social or political 
contexts. Nationalism, as a secular ideology, transformed Islam into a Turkish version 
and Christianity to an Armenian version. This change, however, did not occur in a single 
direction. Religions also influenced the expression of nationalism with their sacred 
languages, symbols, and figures. Thus, there was interaction between nationalism and 
religion, which easily mobilized people toward violence. To improve our judgments and 
understanding of the events of 1915, one has to consider the impact of religions or,rather, 
the politicization of religions towards a nationalistic version in the motivation and 







THE PAPER LADLE (1878) 
Blessed and beloved Armenians: Now, you have all perked up your ears, 
impatiently and anxiously waiting to hear what sort of news Khirimian Hayrig has 
brought us from the Berlin Congress, and what will he say about Article 61 which the 
powerful governments of the world have bestowed upon the Armenian provinces. Listen 
carefully to what I am about to say. Grasp the profound meaning of my words and then 
go and contemplate on my message. 
As you know, upon the decision of Patriarch Nersess and the National Assembly, 
we went to Berlin to present the Armenian Case to the great powers of the Congress. We 
had great hopes that the Congress would bring peace to the world and liberation to the 
small and oppressed nations, among which we count ourselves. 
The Congress convened, the statesmen of the great powers of the world gathered 
around diplomatic tables covered with green cloth. And we, the small and suppressed 
nations waited outside the Congress. In the middle of the Congress, upon a table covered 
with green cloth was placed a large bowl of heriseh∗ from which large and small nations 
and governments would draw their portion. 
                                                 
∗Heriseh is a kind of thick and pasty stew-like meal. 
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Some of the participants pulled to the East, some pulled to the West, and after 
long debates, in order, one by one, they called the representatives of the small nations 
[into the meeting]. The Bulgarian entered first, then Serbian and the Gharadaghian. The 
rattling of the swords hanging from their sides attracted the attention of the assembly. 
After speaking for some while, these three, pulled out their swords, as if ladles 
made of iron, and dipped into the bowl, took their portion of heriseh and proudly and 
boldly departed. 
It was now the turn of the Armenian delegate. I drew near with the paper petition 
from the National Assembly, presented it and asked that they fill my plate too with 
heriseh. Then, the officials standing before the bowl asked me, "Where is your iron ladle? 
It is true that we are serving heriseh here, but he who does not have an iron ladle cannot 
draw from it. Listen up. In the future, if this heriseh is distributed, do not come without a 
ladle or you will return empty handed. 
Dear Armenian people. Could I have dipped my paper ladle in the heriseh? It 
would have become wet and stayed there. There, where guns talk and swords make noise, 
what significance do appeals and petitions have? 
And I saw next to the Gharadaghian, the Bulgarian and other delegates, several 
brave [men], blood dripping from the swords hanging at their sides. I then turned my 
head, as if I was looking for the brave men from Zeitoon, Sasoon, Shadakh and other 
mountainous areas. But where were they? People of Armenia, tell me, where were those 
brave souls?  
Should not one or two of them have been next to me, so that showing their bloody 




                                                
IRON LADLES! They are here, ready!" But alas, all I had was a paper petition, which 
got wet in the heriseh and we returned empty handed. Truly, had they compared me with 
the delegates of the Congress, I was taller, my facial features were more attractive. But to 
what avail? In my hand was placed a piece of paper and not a sword. For this reason we 
were deprived of the heriseh. In spite of all, in view of the future, going to the Congress 
of Berlin was not useless. 
People of Armenia, of course you understand well what the gun could have done 
and can do. And so, dear and blessed Armenians, when you return to the Fatherland, to 
your relatives and friends, take weapons, take weapons and again weapons. People, above 
all, place the hope of your liberation on yourself. Use your brain and your fist! Man must 
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